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the seventh largest navy in the free world, future expansion
has been stymied by Japan's steadfast refusal to increase
defense spending above one percent of the GNP . Long-range
procurement plans focus on qualitative improvements with a
primary emphasis on anti-submarine warfare, a strategy which
could foreshadow a building program to enable the JMSDF to
control the vital sea lanes. On the other hand, political
and domestic constraints on a strong military indicate a
continuing reliance on ttie United States for Japan's security
This study examines the factors affecting military decision-
making in Japan, looks into the problems and realities of
sealane defense and analyzes the future prospects for the
JMSDF.
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Japan's economy, the third largest in the world, is
totally dependent on the sea lines of communication for the
importation of 90 percent of its energy requirements and
strategic metals and for over 70 percent of its food.
Despite the importance of the sealanes to Japanese security,
the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSD?) remains
incapable of protecting those sealanes against interdiction.
Although the JMSDF is currently the seventh largest navy in
the free world, future expansion has been stymied by Japan's
steadfast refusal to increase defense spending above one
percent of the GNP . Long-range procurement plans focus on
qualitative improvements with a primary emphasis on anti-
submarine warfare, a strategy which could foreshadow a building
program to enable the JMSDF to control the vital sea lanes.
On the other hand, political and domestic constraints on a
strong military indicate a continuing reliance on the United
States for Japan's security. This study examines the factors
affecting military decision-making in Japan, looks into the
problems and realities of sealane defense and analyzes the
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Auxiliary, Oiler. Replenishment ship carrying
fuel.
Auxiliary, Oil and Explosives. Replenishment
ship carrying fuel and ammunition.
Anti-Submarine Rocket. Rocket-thrown torpedo.
Anti-Submarine Warfare.
Commander in Chief, Pacific.
Close-in Weapons System. Commonly the Phalanex
gatling-gun system for air defense.
Chief of Maval Operations.
Commander of Naval Forces, Far East.
Commander, Thirteenth xJaval District.
Naval patrol craft usually smaller than a frigate
but larger than a patrol craft
.






Destroyer Escort. Ship-type designed for anti-




One echelon above the squadron level in naval
organization.





























Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force
Depth charge throwing gun. World War II.
Light Airborn Multi-Purpose System. Anti-
submarine helicopter.
Landing Support Ship, Light. Patrol gunboat.
Landing Ship, Tank. Amphibious assualt vessel.
Magnetic Anomaly Detector. Short range locali-
zation system for anti-submarine warfare.
Maritime Safety Agency.
Minesweeper, Coastal.
Code name given to specific Soviet worldwide
naval exercises.
Order Of Battle. Servicable military equipment
Office of Naval Operations
Pacific Fleet.
Patrol Craft, gun equipped.
Patrol Frigate. Ship type for anti-submarine
warfare.
Patrol craft. Torpedo equipped.
Secretary of Defense.
Sea Lines of Communication.
Submarine, diesel-electric
.
Submarine, Ballistic missile eqipped. Nuclear
powered.
Surface-to-Surface Missile.
Small coastal patrol vessels used for anti-
submarine warfare.

TASS Towed Acoustic Surveillance System. Passive
sonar array used for underwater detection.
USCG U.S. Coast Guard.
VDS Variable Depth Sonar.
V/STOL Vertical/Short Take-Off and Landing aircraft




Japan is an industrial giant with a Gross National Pro-
duct (GNP) surpassed only by the United States and the Soviet
Union. Unlike these continental giants, however, Japan has
virtually no natural resources of her own. Her survival is
totally dependent on foreign trade and on her sealanes of
communication, over which passes 90 percent of her energy
supplies, over 95 percent of her strategic metals and 70
percent of her food.
Despite the importance of these sealanes, the maritime
Self-Defense Force (MSDF) is incapable of insuring the safety
of merchant shipping in the face of sealane interdiction by a
hostile power. Despite constant pressure from the United
States to increase her defense spending and to take a larger
role in regional security, Japan has refused steadfastly to
spend more than one percent of her GNP on defense.
Nevertheless, the MSDF, which came into being after World
War II as a small minesweeping force, has gradually expanded
in both size and capability to its current position as the
world's seventh largest navy. In 1976, the Cabinet approved
the National Defense Program Outline (NDPO) which was developed
to meet Japan's long-range defense needs. The NDPO, which
stressed qualitative improvements and modernization over




This paper will attempt to determine the future prospects
for the MSDF . Some questions to be examined will be the ade-
quacy of the NDPO to fulfill Japan's defense needs. In light
of the shift in public opinion from postwar pacifism to current
attitudes more tolerant of defense, will the MSDF continue to
expand and become more important in the regional military
balance? Will the MSDF develop the capability to defend,
unilaterally, the vital sealanes against interdiction? What
are the domestic and international implications of increased
Japanese military strength? Just how critical is sealane
defense to Japan's security? Is sealane defense a possible
and rational choice? Are the current qualitative improvements
in the MSDF the first steps in a long-range plan for sealane
defense?
In answering these questions it is hoped that insights
into Japanese objectives will be realized, making it possible
to better see the path for an effective American policy for
the 1980 's and 1990's.
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II. EVOLUTION OF THE MARITIME SDF : 19^5 TO PRESENT
A. DEMOBILIZATION
On August l4, 19^5, Japan accepted the Potsdam Proclamation
which defined the terms for the unconditional surrender and
the occupation of Japan, thus bringing an end to hostilities
in the Pacific. This was followed on August 29 by President
Truman's "Initial Post-Surrender Policy" in which General
MacArthur, as Supreme Allied Commander (SCAP), was to insure
that
:
Japan will be completely disarmed and demilitarized. The
authority of the militarists and the influence of mili-
tarism will be totally eliminated from her political,
economic, and social life. Institutions expressive of




Disarmament and demilitarization are the primary tasks
of the military occupation and shall be carried out prompt-
ly and with determination.,,
Japan is not to have an army, navy, airforce, secret
police organization, or any civil aviation. Japan's
ground, air, and naval forces shall be disarmed and dis-
banded and the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters, the
General Staff and all secret police organizations shall be
dissolved. Military and naval material, military and navy
vessels and military and naval installations, and military
and civilian aircraft shall be surrendered and shall be
disposed of as required by the Supreme Commander.^
The dismantling of what, only a few months earlier, had
been one of the world's most powerful navies, was set in motion
Submarines and aircraft were sunk or destroyed. Some 135
vessels were given away to Allied navies and others were trans-
ferred to the Merchant Marine. A total of seven carriers,




One sector of the Japanese navy, however, went on relatively
unnoticed and untouched. As early as August 15, this segment of
the Japanese navy was, under U.S. direction, sweeping some of
the 100,000 American and Japanese planted mines from coastal
waters. Sweeping operations took place continuously until
September 1, when U.S. Forces ordered a temporary halt in
order to coordinate plans with participating U.S. units.
Operations resumed eleven days later and were an ongoing
project through 1969. The Imperial Navy force which began
sweeping in 19^5 consisted of 350 vessels and 10,000 men
under the command of Captain Kyuzo Tamura. 3y May 19^6, all
U.S. minesweepers had been withdrawn and operations were
entirely Japanese. Although force levels were progressively
reduced and personnel were officially designated as civilians,
they were exempted from many of the restrictions and demobili-
zation plans. Significantly, due to the nature of minesweeping
operations, the force remained armed. Through continuing
operational experience and with a reduction in U.S. forces,
by 19^9, "...the Japanese minesweeping force was the largest
and most capable in the western Pacific, expert in handling
complex, modern mines. "-^
On May 3, 19^7, the Japanese Constitution came into being.
The impact of this document, specifically Article IX, has had
far-reaching effects on the development of the Japanese navy.
The origin and intent of the wording in Article IX is still
open to debate, but the popular and functional interpretation
was the recognition that sea forces as well as other war
14

potential will not be maintained as a means of settling
international disputes.
In the aftermath of World War II, illegal immigration and
smuggling from Korea caused considerable concern because of
Japan's faltering economy. An outbreak of cholera in Korea
in 19^6 and the resulting influx of refugees spurred SCAP to
action. Based on a survey conducted in 19^6 by Captain Prank
Meals J the USCG commandant, a centralized organization was
set up to handle coastal law enforcement and 28 former
Japanese navy auxiliary subchasers were transferred to the
Ministry of Transportation on August 28, 19^7. V.^ith a nucleus
consisting of these 28 small patrol vessels, the Maritime
Safety Agency came into being on May 1, 19^8, with Cabinet
and Diet approval of the Maritime Safety Board Law. The
final bill restricted the Maritime Safety Agency in terms of:
a. total number of personnel, which was not to exceed
10,000;
b. total number of vessels, which v/as not to exceed
125; the total tonnage of vessels which was not to
exceed 50,000 gross tons;
c. speed of vessels, which was not to exceed fifteen knots;
d. armament of vessels, which was lim.ited to small arms
for maritime safety officials;
e. operating areas of vessels, which was limited to the
high seas adjacent to Japan.
These actions caused Raymond V. Blackman, editor of Jane's
Fighting Ships to comment:
A fleet of 125 vessels, to include a number of ex-minesweepers
and other war-built craft, is being formed to police Jap-
anese waters for fishery protection and to guard against
smuggling and other illegal acts .. .Japanese fleet is about
to arise like a phoenix from its ashes. Though its present
material is limited to 50,000 tons, with no single vessel
displacing more than 1,500 tons, this may well prove to be




Although somewhat overstated in the nearterm, this prediction
proved accurate as Japan embarked on a modest but comprehensive
building program.
The original 28 subchasers, at 125 tons, often found them-
selves too slow and outgunned in respect to the smugglers and
pirates they faced along txheir primary patrol area in the
Tsushima Straits between Japan and Korea. Some vessels
stationed along the northern coast, however, began providing
valuable intelligence information for the United States by
maintaining surveillance of and photographing Soviet warship
activity in northern waters.
North Korean troops crossed the 38th parallel into South
Korea on June 25, 1950. To augment their troops in Korea
reeling under the communist push. Allied commanders looked
for assistance from the U.S. occupation forces in Japan. To
fill the vacuum created by the U.S. troop reduction in Japan,
General MacArthur, on July 8, 1950, authorized Prime Minister
Yoshida to create a 75,000 man National Police Reserve and to
expand the Maritime Safety Agency (MSA) to 3,000 men. Coastal
patrols of the MSA were redirected to provide for the detection
and prevention of amphibious movements against Japanese shores.
Having launched a successful landing at Inchon, MacArthur
wanted a second landing at Wonsan on the east coast of the
Korean Peninsula to spearhead a thrust into North Korea.
Anticipating heavy minefilds in the coastal approaches to
Wonsan and with a U.S. navy minesweeping force in the western
Pacific consisting of only 10 ships, the U.S. Navy turned to
16

the Maritime Safety Agency. Rear Admiral Arleigh Burke,
personally representing the CNO , requested the services of
the MSA minesweeping force. After some hesitation. Prime
Minister Yoshida went along with U.S. desires and on October
10, 1950, Japanese ships under the command of Captain Tamura
began sweeping operations off Korea. Forty-six Japanese
minesweepers saw action between October 10 and December 12,
1950. Two ships were sunk, one by a mine detonation and a
second by grounding. One Japanese sailor was killed and eight
wounded in the sinkings. As the war tempo decreased, units
were sent home and the MSA Korean detachment was formally
disbanded on December 15, 1950.
B. THE BEGINNING
Even as the forty-eight nation Peace Treaty and the U.S.-
Japan Security Treaty were being signed in San Francisco, work
was underway planning the organization of a postwar navy. The
so-called "Y-Committee, " headed by Admiral Yamomoto and
Director General of the MSA Yanagisawa, had strong support
and backing from Admiral Arleigh Burke, Admiral Turner Joy
(COMNAVFE), General Matthew Ridgeway (SCAP), and Admiral
Radford (CINCPAC). Their plan called for the formation of a
Coastal Security Force, officially under MSA but with an
autonomous administration which could become separate at any
time. Officers would be recruited from ex-naval personnel
and the Coastal Security Force would become a de facto navy.
17

It was within this framework that on October 19, 1951,
SCAP offered Japan the use of 68 vessels. Eighteen of the
ships were U.S. made patrol frigates (PF) of 1,400 tons that
had been returned to the U.S. by the USSR at the end of the
war. These units were located in Yokosuka harbor undergoing
repairs. The remaining 50 units, large support landing ships
(230 tons), were still in the United States.
The MSA was not restricting its efforts solely to the
procurement of U.S. aid. By 1952, MSA assets included five
ex-Imperial Japanese Navy (UN) destroyer escorts which were
being used as weather ships, 40 patrol vessels, 42 minesweepers,
and 9 support vessels. In addition, six of a projected fifteen
coastal cutters had been built locally. A new construction
program "which foreshadows the re-birth of the Imperial
Japanese Navy" included three prototype destroyers for ocean,
sea and coastal patrols (2,000, 1,200 and 8OO tons, respective-
7
ly). Japan's maritime capabilities at this point were meager
at best. Although Lloyd's listed Japan's merchant marine as
1,529 vessels at 2.18 million tons, the MSA was only lightly
armed and incapable of sustained, at-sea operations. Anti-
submarine and antiaircraft capabilities were non-existent.
The U.S .-Japanese Security Treaty went into effect on
April 28, 1952, and on July 30 the plans of the Y-Committee
became reality with the promulgation of the National Safety
Agency Law which established the Coastal Security Force and




The legal vehicle by which the 68 ships would be leased to
Japan was the Charter Party Agreement that went into effect
on December 27, 1952, and on January 14, the first six frigates
and three landing craft were transferred. The Agreement pro-
vided the vessels on a five-year loan subject to renewal for
an additional five years.
The l8 Tree-class patrol frigates with three 3-inch guns
and antiaircraft cannons and the 50 Flower-class (LSSL) gun-
boats with a single 3-inch gun finally provided some firepower
for the Coastal Security Force. Planners pursued an optimistic
course. Construction began on sixteen ships totalling 9,000
tons including five frigates, two with 5-inch guns. Two 5-year
plans were developed for consideration, one calling for 165
ships at 3^0,000 tons, including ten aircraft carriers and
five cruisers J while the second plan was more modest, deleting
the aircraft carriers and calling for 95 ships of 148,000 tons.
The signing of the U.S. -Japan Mutual Defense Assistance
Agreement on March 8, 1954, provided a new avenue for strength-
ening Japanese maritime forces. Under the Agreement, a loan
by the United States to Japan, of 159 ships, was negotiated.
The package included eight destroyers, one submarine, four
tank landing ships (LST) and numerous minesweepers and support
Q
ships. Seventeen of those ships, including two destroyers
(Gleaves-class ) and two destroyer escorts (Bostwick-class )
,
were transferred in October. Most of these ships and others
transferred on lease would be reclassified by the U.S. as
being in excess of requirements prior to the expiration of
19

the loan. They would then be stricken from U.S. rolls and
in effect become a grant-in-aid to Japan.
As a result of a growing awareness for the need to provide
for national defense against external aggression and in
consideration of the political sensitivity of Article IX of
the Constitution, the Yoshida government sought a solution
less drastic than constitutional amendment. A committee
consisting of the representatives of the National Safety
Agency, the Liberal, Progressive and Japan Liberal parties
drafted a joint proposal to totally amend the National Safety
Agency Law of 1952. The Defense Agency Establishment Law
and Self-Defense Forces Law were passed on June 9, 195^, and
went into effect on July 1, creating the Japanese Defense
Agency (JDA), the Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) and
retaining the Maritime Safety Board (later the Maritime Safety
Agency (MSA)) as an equivalent to the U.S. Coast Guard. The
original MSDF organization provided for two escort flotillas,
one patrol flotilla and five regional districts. (Figure 2-1)
The next two years were dedicated to consolidating the
administrative organization of the MSDF and in continuing the
ambitious program of acquisitions and construction. By 1956,
the MSDF counted 28 destroyer type ships, one submarine, ^9
mine warfare craft and various support craft . The submarine
was the Kuroshio (ex-USS Gato), on loan from the United
States. The major surface combatants included two Harukaze-
class destroyers (DD) at 1,700 tons and armed with three 5-
inch guns, eight 40 mm anti-aircraft guns, and anti-submarine
20

FIGURE 2-1: MSDF Organization as of July 1, 195^
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Source: Japan Defense Agency
weapons of two hedgehog rocket launchers, two depth charge
racks and eight K-guns. Three new Akebono-class frigates
(DE) had also been completed. These frigates had two 3-inch
guns and roughly one half the ASW armament of the Harukaze-class
Nine additional Harukaze destroyers and 14 smaller craft were
under construction. Being procurred from the United States
were 29 LST's and 55 landing craft. Total personnel in the
MSDF numbered 22,716.
The Maritime Safety Board also was keeping pace with naval
expansion. They had begun arming patrol vessels in 195^ and
21

by 1956 possessed seven large patrol vessels (1,000 tons) and
46 smaller craft (300-500 tons). The merchant marine had also
expanded to 1,770 ships of 3-73 million tons.
C. BUILD-UP PLANS
Since its inception in 1954, the mission of the MSDF had
not been explicitly defined. The minesweeping forces, still
engaged in clearing World War II mines from coastal waters,
were the only units with a specific purpose. Other MSDF
forces, assigned to a growing number and variety of Japanese
and U.S. made ships, engaged in general training toward no
distinctive task. The creation of the National Defense
Council in 1956 addressed the development of a national
defense policy and on May 20, 1957, the Cabinet approved the
"Basic National Defense Policy." The document, which is
still in effect, defined the basic policy as:
The objective of national defense is to prevent direct
and indirect aggression, but once invaded, to repel
such aggression, thereby preserving the independence and
peace of Japan founded upon democratic principles.
To achieve this objective, the Government of Japan hereby
establishes the following principles;
1. To support the activities of the United Nations,
and promote international coorperation, thereby
contributing to the realization of world peace.
2. To stabilize the public welfare and enhance the
people's love for the country, thereby establishing
the sound basis essential to Japan's security.
3. To develop progressively the effective defense
capabilities necessary for self-defense, with due
regard to the nation's resources and the prevailing
domestic situation.
U. To deal with external aggression on the basis of
the Japan-U.S. security arrangements, pending more
effective functioning of the United Nations in




As can be imagined, few arguments were settled as a
result of the policy. The basic principles did not include
specific tasking for the MSDF, but just as significantly,
did not place any rigid restrictions on their development.
Building plans for the naval forces had been drawn up
periodically since the creation of the National Safety
Agency in 1952 but had been implemented only on a piecemeal
basis. In 1956, the National Defense Council prepared a
new five-year defense plan (1956-60) which included a fleet
of 211 ships of 111,300 tons. Three weeks after the approval
of the Basic Policy, the Cabinet approved a building program
which incorporated the final three years of the 1956 plan.
Under the officially designated First Defense Buildup Program
(1958-60), the MSDF was authorized 9^.5 billion yen (S26O
million) toward a goal of 124,000 tons of ships and 222
aircraft. ~ In pursuit of that goal, three new classes of
destroyers were built. The Murasama (DDA) was primarily an
anti-aircraft model with 5-inch and 3--inch guns and a basic
ASW suite. The Ayanami (DDK) had an identical hull design
but was outfitted with sonar and a full complement of ASW
weapons. The third new class was the Akizuki (DD) which
was built under the "offshore" program (U.S. designed/
Japanese built), became the largest ship in the inventory
at 2,000 tons. The Akizuki was a dual purpose destroyer
with three 5-inch and four 3-inch guns and a full ASW
package including sonar, torpedo tubes, two hedgehog
23

rocket launchers, Y-guns and depth charge racks. Further
supplementing the surface navy was the acquisition of two
Fletcher-class destroyers from the U.S. in 1959.
The Japanese designed Oyashio submarine (SS) became
operational in 1953 and the following year, the hulls were
laid down for the first two units of the more advanced but
smaller Hayashio (SS) class diesel submarine (750 tons).
The MSDF maintained their excellent minesweeping force
by continuing a building program to replace older vessels.
Eight new minesweepers were provided in the First Buildup
program. (See Table 2-1.)
The land-based ASW aircraft, the P-2, was also intro-
duced during the First Buildup Plan. Nine squadrons of these
long-range prop driven patrol planes was the initial procure-
ment goal.
By i960, the MSDF had 57 major surface combatants, two
submarines and 142 other vessels. The Maritime Safety
Agency had also continued to grow and numbered seven large
patrol vessels and 97 medium and small vessels. The merchant
marine had ballooned to 2,413 vessels at 5-47 million tons.
The signing of the Treaty of Mutual. Cooperation and
Security wi'th the United States on January 19, I960,
signaled a leveling off of the quantitative growth of the
MSDF. Long range trends would see continued improvements
in ASW and the maintenance of an excellent mine warfare
24

capability, but the unilateral nature of the Treaty was a
major factor in dampening construction programs.
The Second (1962-66) and Third (1967-71) Defense Buildup
Programs called for an increase of major surface combatants
from 57 to 59, however it should be noted that due to the
replacement of many World War II vintage vessels by modern
units, a significant qualitative improvement was realized.
During this same period, substantial gains were made in
ASW capabilities with the addition of 10 submarines and five
squadrons of land-based ASW aircraft.
The Third Buildup Program was specifically geared toward
improvements in the maritime defense capacity. Destroyers
were to be equipped with surface-to-air missiles for air
defense and with helicopters for anti-submarine defense.
Five new submarines were authorized.
Qualitative improvements in the form of new ship classes
and in weapons and sensor systems added to the overall
mission capabilities of the MSDF. The Amatsukaze (DDG)
introduced the U.S. built Tartar surface-to-air missile
system in 1962 providing a new realrain air defense. That
same year, the oiler Hamana (AO, 3,500 tons) became
operational, allowing MSDF units to refuel at sea for the
first time.
In 1964, the first of five Ooshio-class submarines
entered the fleet. With eight torpedo tubes and displacing
1,600 tons, this was the largest and most capable submarine
25

to date. Construction also began on two new classes of
destroyers, the Takatsuki and Yamagumo. These units were
equipped with improved sonar systems and the U.S. developed
ASROC (anti-submarine rocket) system. In view of these
developments, the 1964-5 edition of Jane '
s
stated that the
MSDF "has risen like a phoenix and comprises newly built
warships of most categories .. .With a now substantial fleet,
Japan can take her place among the naval powers.""
By 1967, the merchant marine was nearing 15 million tons
with over 6,000 registered ships. The Maritime Safety
Agency numbered 3? patrol vessels, 211 smaller patrol craft
and 52 support vessels.
In 1970, the first of the Chikugo-class destroyer escorts
(DE) entered service. F.leven of these capable but relatively
inexpensive vessels would eventually be built.
The final year of the Third Buildup Program brought in a
new minelayer and a new class of modern minesweeper.
Construction began on an even larger class of diesel submarine,
the Uzushio-class (SS), at 1,800 tons, 236 feet long, and
capable of over 20 knots submerged. Another big addition
was the Haruna-class helicopter destroyer (DDH) . Equipped
with a modern long-range sonar, three ASW helicopters,
torpedo tubes and ASROC, the Haruna represented one of the
most capable ASW platforms in the world.
Advances in land-based ASW aircraft had also been made.
Fourteen squadrons were in existence including updated
26

versions of the P-2 (J) and the unique ?S-1 flying boat.
The Japanese designed aircraft was capable of operating in
very heavy seas and would use a submersible sonar lowered
from the belly of the craft to locate submarines.
Based on the 1971 Okinawa Reversion Agreement, Okinawa
was returned to Japan in 1972 greatly increasing the scope
of the MSDP ' s sea defense zone in terms of ocean area. The
Fourth Buildup Plan (1972-76) did not reflect these added
responsibilities. Projected changes called for two additional
major combatants, two submarines and two more squadrons of
land-based ASW aircraft. A second Haruna-class DDH was
completed and construction on a new multipurpose destroyer
(Tachikaze DDG at 3,300 tons, 5-inch guns, Standard (U.S.)
surface-to-air missile, torpedo tubes, ASROC, sonar and a
variable depth sonar (VDS)) was begun.
The merchant marine reflected the Japanese economic
boom of the late 60s and early 70s and their massive world
seaborn trade. By 1976, almost 9,500 vessels were under the
Japanese flag comprising almost 37 million tons.
The Nixon Doctrine of withdrawing U.S. forces from Asia
and encouraging a more autonomous defense was just one of
the factors leading to public discussions of previously taboo
subjects such as defense. As a result of these developments
and considerable efforts at the working level, joint U.S.-
Japanese consultations on military and security matters were




D. NATIONAL DEFENSE PROGRAM OUTLINE
With the completion of the Fourth Buildup Plan in 1976
the Cabinet adopted the National Defense Program Outline.
Unlike the previous plans, the Outline has no specific time
requirements for its completion but rather depends on annual
budgetary decisions as to what will be allocated in each
fiscal year. To provide a means of continuity, a Mid-term
Program Estimate was drafted which covers a five year
period. The Estimate is used as a planning document only,
and is subject to annual review. A new estimate is drafted
every three years. The current Estimate was formualted in
1979 and covers the period from FY80 through FY84.
For the MSDF the National Defense Program Outline (NOP)
calls for 60 major surface ships, I6 submarines and about
220 aircraft. As of I98O, shortfalls exist of one surface
ship, two submarines and thirty aircraft. Based on current
construction programs the NDP goal would be exceeded by 1985?
however, due to expected retirements, force levels will
probably remain static slightly short of NDP goals.
Since 1976 major additions have been the support ship
Sagami (AOE) in 1979, the first of five Yuushio-class
submarines (SS) and the first of two Shirane-class DDHs , a
follow-on to the Haruna-class . The 5,000 ton Sagami (AOE)
will provide a needed backup to the aging Hamana for at-sea
refueling. The Yuushio (SS) represents the newest, largest
and fastest addition to the Japanese submarine fleet. The
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diesel-powered submarine displaces 2,200 tons and may be
fitted with the submarine launched version of the Harpoon
anti-ship missile in addition to her normal torpedo loadout
.
The Shirane (DDH) , at 5,200 tons and 520 feet long, is
slightly bigger than the Haruna. The Shirane will also
carry three ASW helicopters, sonar, A3R0C and torpedoes.
Improvements will include a variable depth sonar and a towed
passive sonar array (TASS). Self-defense capability will be
significantly improved with the Sea Sparrow surface-to-air
missile system and two Phalanex close-in weapons systems
(CIWS).
E. CAPABILITIES
The primary emphasis in the MSDF is on anti-submarine
warfare. Current ASW weaponry includes 59 ships, 130 land-
14based patrol aircraft, 60 helicopters and l4 submarines.
The professionalism and training level in the MSDF is on a
par with any in the world. Continuing qualitative improve-
ments in equipment and technology have placed the Japanese
at the forefront of ASW development.
The surface component of Japan's ASW defense is modern
and the units are individually capable but they lack suffi-
Goent numbers to provide a viable convoy escort function.
The ship mounted sonars are excellent, comparable with some
of the best in the U.S. The second of new Shirane-class
(DDH) will be outfitted with a passive towed hydrophone

































































































































































































TABLE 2-2: SHIPS OF THE JAPANESE MARITIME
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capability. The introduction of this previously unavialable
passive capability could mark a shift in tactical thought for
the Japanese, a shift that was made in the U.S. Navy several
years ago.
Shipboard ASV/ helicopters also provide a valuable dimension
to detection and prosecution capability of the MSDF . The
helicopters are equipped with a dipping sonar and also carry
ASW torpedoes. One limitation is their lack of any passive
detection equipment such as sonabuoys or magnetic anomaly
detection (MAD) gear.
Another significant limitation is the weapons available
to MSDF forces. Even though most units now have the ASROC
delivery system for torpedoes, the Japanese use the MK-44
which is generally considered ineffective against modern
nuclear submarines. Research and development of an advanced
torpedo is underway and the Japanese are expected to acquire
the MK-46 torpedo from the U.S. ^^
The Japanese submarine fleet, although experiencing the
same difficulties as the surface fleet with the MK-M4 torpedo,
is highly capable and excellently suited to maintaining
control of the straits around Japan. Because all the units
are diesel powered, they cannot be used for any role in con-
voy escort or open-ocean sealane protection where high speeds
and long periods of submersion are necessary.
The final component of Japan's ASW team, the land-based
air arm, is undergoing rapid expansion and improvements. To
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replace the older and less capable ?-2J and ?S-1 aircraft,
P-3C Orion patrol craft have been purchased from the U.S.
and Kawasaki Heavy Industries has been licensed to co-produce
forty-five more aircraft through 1984. There is some specula-
tion that the Defense Agency is considering increasing the
1 fitotal procurement package to 170 aircraft. The P-3C is
equipped with torpedoes, sonabuoys, radar and MAD, but its
primary advantage over previous models is a sophisticated
computer processing capability. The P-3C is best suited to
the role of open ocean ASW and is excellent for convoy
protection.
Japan is also continuing its program for shipboard
helicopters and newer HSS-2B helicopters are being procurred.
There is also a report that the Defense Agency will buy the
LAMPS III helicopter from the U.S. which would add the dimension
17
of passive detection with sonabuoys to the surface :leet.
Air defense, both in terms of weapons and electronic
countermeasures , is the MSDF's most significant weakness.
While operating in coastal waters, the MSDF would have to
depend on the ASDF for air cover but in an open ocean environ-
ment, they would have to rely on allied naval air forces.
The Japanese have recognized this problem and air defense
weapons are being installed on all new construction
destroyers. These weapons, primarily the short-range Sea
Sparrow missile and a close-in weapon system (CIWS), will
enhance the self-defense capability of an individual unit
35

but can provide no protection for escorted units. Only
three destroyers have the longer range Standard missile
system.
The inadequacy of electronic countermeasures is also
acknowledged, but has not received the same measure of response
as has the lack of missiles.
Current MSDF capability in anti-surface warfare is
limited to gunfire and torpedoes which provide a poor matchup
against any surface-to-surface missile (SSM) equipped ship.
Recognizing this deficiency and in light of the growing trend
to equip ships with SSMs , the new destroyer escort Ishikari
will be outfitted with the U.S. -made Harpoon missile as will
two other new destroyer classes which have just begun con-
struction. The new Yuushio-class submarine will also be
1 8
given a submerged launched version of the Harpoon SSM.
Many small countries have begun to rely on SSM equipped fast
patrol boats for coastal defense, a strategy that would be
well suited to Japan for control of the Straits. Although it
has been reported that Japan has been working on a SSM hydro-
foil design for the Fourth Buildup Plan, no official procure-
ment plans or research and development efforts have been
announced.
Japan's mine warfare capability ranks as one of the best
in the world. Their fleet of modern minesweepers is being
continually renewed and in case of war, possesses the ability
to keep vital coastal sealanes and harbors free to traffic.
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The ability to close the Japanese straits through offensive
mining is more doubtful. There is only one designated mine-
layer in the inventory and most other surface vessels would
require time-consuming alterations. Submarines could be
used but only at the expense of torpedo capacity. ASW
aircraft would also be available but their small capacity
would be a serious disadvantage. A possible solution lies
in the purchase of C-I30 transports from the U.S. which are
20
reported to be intended for minelaying. A secondary
problem is the adequacy of the mine stockpile. Seriously
deficient in the mid-1960s, the Third Buildup Plan provided
funding for mine construction but deficiencies still exist.
Because of the large numbers of mines that would be required
to close off the straits, the problem of planting sufficient
numbers in a short time remains a serious consideration.
Another area of deficiency is that of at-sea resupply.
Japan has only two ships capable of refueling ships at sea
and only one of those can rearm. To provide for sustained
operations or convoy escort duties, an at-sea replenishment
capability is a necessity.
P . TRENDS
The Japanese seem to be satisfied with current force
levels in the general sense. Emphasis is on sustaining
qualitative improvements in all warfare areas rather than
pushing for quantitative gains. Deficiencies have been
identified in the areas of air defense and anti-submarine
37

warfare and corrective measures have been implemented.
Deficiencies in logistics and electronic warfare remain
unaddressed.
Anti-submarine warfare has dominated the MSDF ' s priority
list for some time and no change is anticipated. Trends
toward passive detection techniques and helicopter prosecution
of submarine contacts will continue to develop much along the
line of U.S. tactical doctrines. Submarines will continue
in their role as independent units as opposed to a role in
direct support and coordinated action with surface units.
Ships are generally being designed as multi-purpose
platforms. Because of the close proxim.ity of the Soviet
Union and the realization that the MSDF operating area is
within range of Soviet land-based aircraft, the luxury of
a high-low mix cannot be afforded. Each unit must be able
to provide its own self-protection regardless of the threat.
This trend has contributed to a gradual increase in ship
size from the 1,500 ton limit imposed by the Maritime Safety
Board Law in 1948 to the 5,200 ton Shirane-class DDH.
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III. POLITICAL CONSTRAINTS ON A STRONG MILITARY
A. OVERVIEW
One cannot even begin to postulate the military goals
and objectives for a nation without first examining the
internal decision-making process of the government. Japan
is no exception. Public opinion, coalition politics,
economic and business interests, all play a dominant role
in the determination of Japan's military future. The after-
math of World War II created a lingering aversion to
military power and has had a profound influence on the
development of Japan as a unique world power, one almost
devoid of military capability. Domestic questions continue
to dominate all aspects of Japanese life even to the extent
that international politics and foreign policy decisions
are made primarily within the context of their effect on
the domestic situation and economic well-being.
This chapter will examine Japanese decision-making as it
relates to defense issues. The effects and importance of
public opinion, coalition politics, and economic interests
will be considered. The constraints imposed by the 19^6
Constitution on the development of military forces also
will be examined in the legal and moral aspects. The
attitudes and opinions of various groups in the decision-
making process also will be analyzed.
39

The second half of the chapter will deal with Japan's
foreign policy as it relates to military concerns. Bilateral
relations with the U.S. and the USSR will be discussed in
addition to relationships with the other major Asian
nations. Particular attention will be given to the atti-
tudes of these Asian nations and of the superpowers in
regards to their postures toward a remilitarized Japan and
toward their perceptions of Japan's role in the future of




Just after the formation of the Japanese Cabinet
under the direction of the Supreme Commander for Allied
Powers (SCAP) on October 9, 19^5, a committee was formed to
draft a constitution under which the new nation of Japan
would be governed. This committee, composed of university
professors, scholars, and officials of the Cabinet Legis-
lative Bureau, submitted their draft constitution, which was
largely based on the principals of the Meiji Constitution,
to SCAP in February of 19^6. General MacArthur rejected
the draft in its entirety with specific objection to its
provision for unrestricted military forces. Brigadier
General Courtney Whitney, chief of the Occupation's Govern-
ment Section, was then given the task of preparing an
acceptable version within MacArthur 's guidelines.
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A specific point of contention has been Article 9
of this Constitution which is quoted below:
Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on
justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce
war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat
or use of force as means of settling international
disputes
.
In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph,
land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential,
will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of
the state will not be recognized.
There has been considerable debate regarding the origin of
the idea for this article. MacArthur claimed that the
suggestion came from Prime Minister Shidehara and that he
(MacArthur) maintained from the out-set that a renunciation
of war did not prevent any and all steps for self-defense.
A second school maintains that the war-rejection clause was
conceived by and insisted upon by SCAP.
Discussion of Article 9 in the Japanese House of
Representatives focused on the right of self-defense and
led to the inclusion of the phases, "Aspiring sincerely to an
international peace based on justice and order," in the
first paragraph and, "In order to accomplish the aim of
the preceding paragraph," in the second paragraph. The
amendments received no objection from SCAP and after approval
of the Privy Council, House of Representatives, and House of
Peers, the Constitution was sanctioned by the Emperor and
was promulgated on November 3, 19^6, to go into effect six
months later. It was only a few years later that Hitoshi
Ashida, the chairman of the Constitutional Amendment

Committee, announced that the amendments to Article 9 were
designed to permit rearmament for self-defense.
Supporters of the defense forces still maintain that
an opening phrase in the second paragraph qualifies the ban
on maintenance of military forces to be applicable only for
threatening or for settling international disputes. This
interpretation has been challenged unsuccessfully three times
2before Japan's Supreme Court. The Suzuki case in 1952 was
dismissed with the Court finding that a judgement may be
made only if there is a legal dispute between parties. The
second challenge, the Sunakawa case in 1959, involved a legal
dispute between parties. Persons arrested for trespassing
on a U.S. m.ilitary facility during a der.onstration based
their defense on Article 9. They argued that the Japan-
United States Security Treaty of 1951, v;hich created the
U.S. military presence in general, and the base in question
in particular, was unconstitutional according to Article 9;
therefore no offense had been comm.itted. The Court ruled
in this case that the content of the Security Treaty of 1951,
is "inseparably related to the high degree of political con-
sideration or discretionary power on the part of the Cabinet,
and on the part of the Diet which approved it. Consequently,
as a rule, there is a certain elem^ent of incompatibility in
the process of Judicial determination on its constitution-
ality by a court of law..."-^
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The Court went on to say that the Security Treaty was instru-
mental in the defense and security of the nation and as such,
the matter belonged under the auspices of the Diet and the
Cabinet and ultimately the "sovereign" people and therefore
the court had no jurisdiction in the case. In the most
recent case, a district court judge in Sapporo ruled that
the Self-Defense Forces were based on unconstitutional laws
and were therefore extralegal. This decision sent Shockwaves
through the government until a higher court overturned this
so-called Naganuma case in August of 1976.
Tension in the Middle East in late I98O led to
open discussion in Japan concerning the defense of sea
lanes, including constitutional considerations involved in
safeguarding the flow of oil from the Middle East. In
November, Prime Minister Suzuki, in responding to questions
in a session of the House of Representatives Special Commit-
tee on Security Affairs, made it clear that the MSDF can
legally protect Japanese merchant ships on the high seas
4
against attack. Following these remarks, in February
1981, Justice Minister Okuno stated that the Liberal-
Democratic Party (LDP) may propose a constitutional amend-
ment in the I983 Upper House elections. Whether Okuno 's
statement was meant to test the political wind or was the
result of diverging opinions within the LDP, is undetermined,
however Prime Minister Suzuki, in a House of Representative
Budget committee hearing, responded to opposition party
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outrage by affirming that his administration has no inten-
tion of proposing any constitutional amendments specifically
5including Article 9-
A public opinion poll in March 1981, indicated
approval of Suzuki's stand but highlighted the magnitude of
the Constitutional problem. Seventeen percent believed the
SDF not to be in violation of the Constitution and 23 per-
cent were unsure. On the question of revising the Con-
stitution as it pertains to the renunciation of war and
maintenance of armed forces, 2k percent favored Constitution-
al revision, while 61 percent were opposed.
2. Defense Spending
Of all the many aspects of the Japanese defense
policy, the one area that seems to dominate the press and
public discussion is the military budget. Defense spending
in Japan has been held at less than two percent of the GNP
since 1955, and has been below one percent since 1967.
This compares to four to six percent by the U.S. and NATO
7
and twelve to fourteen percent for the USSR. Even though
there has been a steady increase from .79 percent of GNP
in 1970 to .91 percent for 1981, the basic figures have
often been cited by American critics of Japanese policy who
assert that Japan is taking a "free ride" for her defense.
Many Japanese, on the other hand, counter that the U.S. is
responsible for the Constitutional prohibitions of offen-
sive military capability and point to the low spending
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levels as proof that Japan has no aspirations toward military
power.
In a recent public opinion poll conducted by Asahi
Shimbun , 14 percent of those polled thought that the future
security of Japan should be protected through autonomous
defense and the large-scale expansion of the SDP. In the
same poll, when asked if the country's defense budget should
be increased, 26 percent replied that it should be increased
while 57 percent disagreed.
Taking a different view of the figures, one must
realize that even though defense spending levels remained
relatively constant as a percentage of the GNP , the growth
in Japan's GNP provided for a real annual increase between
Q
1974 and 1979 of 19 percent, not considering inflation.
The 1981 budget is set at approximately .9 percent
of the GNP or $19 billion. While proponents for a strong
defense will lament that less than I8 percent is earmarked
for hardware procurement, opponents of a strong defense
will counter that the I98I defense budget called for an
overall increase of 9-7 percent while all other sectors of
government were capped with 7-9 percent increase ceilings.
Amid continuing pleas from the U.S. that Japan
increase her defense spending, the most recent development
is the emergence of a new organization which will undoubted-
ly add still more confusion to the already perplexing
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(CNSC) has been formed to assume an advisory role to the
Prime Minister. Although it possesses no official function,
its work roughly parallels that of the Diet-recognized
National Defense Council. The CNSC-proposed Comprehensive
Security Policy further clouds the defense spending issue by
advocating spending five percent of the GNP for security,
while stipulating a very broad interpretation of that term
to include foreign aid, resource development, and cultural
exchange, as well as defense. In this matter, the CNSC,
representing the LDP party line, hopes to maintain maximum
maneuvering room while quelling conservative pressure to
increase Japan's role in regional defense on one hand, and
avoiding liberal outrage on the other by refusing any sig-
nificant increases in direct military spending.
In late April lS8l, prior to his departure for a
visit to the United States, Prime Minister Suzuki, in
separate statements, vowed to keep Japan's defense spending
below one percent of GNP (if the country could maintain its
current annual economic growth rate) and to attain the target
levels of the 1976 Defense Program Outline by the end of
fiscal 1987.^^
It is obvious that the figures can be manipulated to
almost any point of view and there is no reason to doubt that
the defense spending debate will rage unabated. The bottom
line however, is that in absolute terms, Japan is the seventh
largest defense spender in the free world. Her military
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forces are weak compared to her massive economic power, but
the Japanese naval force is rated as the seventh m.ost power-
ful in the world and the third strongest in the Pacific,
behind only the U.S. and the USSR.
3 . Public Opinion - Changing Attitudes
Public opinion in Japan, as in the United States,
has no formal role in the decision making process except in
the election of officials and in extreme cases where demon-
strations indicate that at least a portion of the population
is in opposition to the relevant action. It should also be
noted however, that because of the Japanese style of consensus
decision-making, the ringisei model, polls and public opinion
have an even greater impact on politics and decision m.aking
in Japan than in America.
Public opinion polls got their start in the Occu-
pation era as a SCAP project to sample reactions to various
programs. Prom this beginning in the Japanese government's
Board of Information, by 19^9 the National Public Opinion
Research Institute had been created drawing from government
agencies, newspapers, and independent research groups. The
Institute was officially abolished in 195^, but continued and
substantial efforts in the field have been led most notably
by the Public Opinion Division of the Prime Minister's
office and by the Asahi Shimbun , Japan's leading newspaper
with a circulation of seven million.
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The basis of current public opinion began with the
rejection of the ultranationalism of World War II and the
humiliation of occupation. The additional shock of being
the only civilization to have suffered the detonation of
atomic weapons has also had a fundamental role in formula-
ting Japanese public opinion. Prom these beginnings the
Japanese acquired a nuclear "allergy" and total distain for
military forces. Their outlook was one of seeing the arm.ed
forces only as tools of war, not having any political or
diplomatic purpose. The concept of sending troops abroad
for any reason was totally rejected. There has, hov/ever,
been a gradual but consistent change in these attitudes over
the years with the most dramatic change taking place over the
last ten years. The nature of this change cannot be de-
scribed as revolutionary but rather as an evolutionary
process with change occurring in extremely small increments.
Public opinion polls demonstrate rather vividly
this gradual shift in attitude. In polls commissioned by
the Prime Minister's office in 1972, 1975, and 1978, on the
question of supporting the maintenance of the Self-Defense
Forces, 73, 79, and 85 percent respectively responded in the
affirmative. The same poll also asked whether Japan should
rely on the U.S . -Japanese Mutual Security Treaty as an
Integral part of Japan's security policy. The poll showed
41, 54, and 6l percent in favor while, 16, 9, and 5 percent
1^favored the abrogation of the pact. Polls by Asahi
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Shimbun in 1978 and 1981, showed an increase from 77 percent
to 83 percent in people who favored strengthening or main-
taining the SDF at present level. The group favoring a
reduction in the size of the SDF has remained relatively
unchanged at between 6 and 7 percent.
A changing attitude can also be seen in the form of
protests and demonstrations of military activities and poli-
cies. In 1973 the Socialist Party led a massive movement to
insure that Japan's American-made F-4 Phantom fighters had
their bombsights removed and their in-flight refueling
systems plugged to insure that the planes could be used for
defensive purposes only. There was no such protest in 1978
when advanced F-15 fighter jets were delivered to Japan.
In the early 1970s it was unheard of for a Japanese
warship to engage in wargames or even joint training exer-
cises with U.S. naval units. The mid-1970s saw joint ASW
exercises in Japanese contiguous waters. In 1978 two
Japanese destroyers and a squadron of ASW patrol aircraft
participated in multipurpose joint training exercises at
Pearl Harbor. In February of 198O, Japanese ships and air-
craft participated in multi-national wargames near Hawaii.
In response to this participation, the Socialist Party
sponsored a peaceful demonstration by 6,000 marchers at the
Yokosuka naval base. This was the first such rally at the
base since 1973 when it was announced that the aircraft
carrier Midway would be homeported at Yokosuka. The main
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thrust of the February protest was the "fear that the naval
exercise may pave the way for sending the Japanese military
15
overseas for the first time since World War II."
Government action to dispel these attitudes came in October
of 1980 when the Japanese were approached with the possi-
bility of participating in a U.N. sponsored supervisory fleet
in the Hormuz Strait. The official reply of the Suzuki
governmient was that while participation of Japanese armed
forces in an overseas peace-keeping mission was Constitution-
ally legal, the Japanese would not participate and would not
support such an action.
Joint exercises will continue as shown by a recent
announcement of Japan's intent to participate in the multi-
national RIMPAC exercise scheduled for early 1982, however
the volitility of the situation was demonstrated by the can-
cellation of joint U . S . -Japanese ASW exercises in the Sea of
Japan following claims by commercial fishermen that the
maneuvers had caused damage to their fishing nets.
In July of 1978, General Hiroomi Kirisu, the Chief
of the Joint Staff Council (equivalent to the Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the U.S.) was asked to resign
his post because of remarks he made which intimated that
Japanese defense forces, if attacked by surprise, may not
wait for the Prime Minister's authorization before they
17
returned fire. The General's error was mainly one or tact
rather than principle. Immediately after the General's
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dismissal. Prime Minister Pukuda ordered the Defense Agency
to study the issues including procedures to be followed in
case of attack. Although a causal relationship cannot be
established, it is interesting to note that in 1980, Japanese
fighter aircraft, for the first time, are being armed with
air-to-air missiles when on routine patrol and when respond-
ing to possible violations of Japanese airspace. Additional-
ly, the Maritime SDF has announced that its vessels and ASW
patrol aircraft are now being armed with live torpedoes and
1 8
mines. Previously, ships had carried only gun ammunition
and patrol aircraft had been unarmed. It remains to be seen
if the 7^ Harpoon missile systems scheduled for procurement
will be installed in ships and aircraft or be stockpiled
ashore
.
In a similar case. Chairman of the Joint Staff
Council, General Goro Takeda, in a magazine interview with
Hoseki, expressed disagreement with official defense poli-
cies and with the ban on conscription. His comments indi-
cated that the policy of refraining from military action
until the enemy has attacked Japanese territory is simply
not a realistic approach to defense of the nation. Regard-
ing conscription, the General objected to Cabinet use of
Articles 13 and l8 of the Constitution to amplify their
stand against conscription. General Takeda explained that
the Constitutional ban on "bondage" and "involuntary servitude"
should not be equated with military service. In the face
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of opposition party pressure, Takeda was asked to resubmit
his resignation and was given an official warning. Prime
Minister Suzuki and Director General of the Japanese Defense
Agency Omura stated their resolve to tighten civilian control
over the military.
Whether the actions of these two generals were de-
signed as trial balloons or simply two men expressing their
own opinions is not important. The end result is that their
viewpoints received widespread press coverage and opened
up avenues for public discussion. Personal sacrifice in each
case is negligible since Kirisu was near retirement and
Takeda had already submitted his resignation. It could be
argued that the publicity enhanced their marketability for
civilian employment. Nevertheless, changes in government
policy did occur following Kirisu' s statements and discussion
surrounding the Takeda statements could generate policy
changes as well.
Another indication of a changing attitude toward
defense is a record number of applicants for admission to
the Japanese Defense Academy. In 1978, 14,304 youths applied
for admission, suggesting increasing interest in a career
as an officer in the SDF, a vocation -previously lacking
widespread prestige in Japan. The Wall Street journal
reported that the military is getting much more coverage by
the mass media, politicians are displaying models and photo-
graphs of military hardware in their offices and military
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enlistments are rising indicating increased public accep-
22
tance of the military.
Many explanations have been offered to explain this
changing of attitudes but, reduced to basic terms, the Japan-
ese perceive the basis of their national security as becom-
ing weaker while the threat to their security is getting
stronger. The U.S. -Japan Mutual Security Treaty has been the
cornerstone of Japan's security policy since I960, however
Japan's assessm.ent of U.S. strength and resolve in Asia has
been eroded by current events. The United States' defeat in
Vietnam, announced troop withdrawals from South Korea, the
relative decline in U.S. economic strength (as evidenced by
continuing high inflation and the decline of relative GNP),
and the shifting of U.S. naval units from the Pacific to
the Indian oceans have all been cited as examples of declin-
23ing U.S. strength. In April 1978, a poll by Yumiri
Shimbun shov/ed that only 21 percent thought that the U.S.
would come to Japan's assistance if she were attacked while
o 2438 percent said the U.S. would not. Similar polls by the
Asahi Shimbun in 1979 and 1981 revealed that 60 percent and
59 percent respectively, did not believe that the U.S. would
25honor its commitment.
The 1973 oil embargo highlighted for many Japanese
the country's total dependence on foreign oil and the fragile
nature of her sea lanes. A USIA sponsored poll in 197^
indicated that 85 percent of the university-educated public
5^

and 78 percent of the general public knew that obtaining oil
was a serious problem for Japan. Significantly however, a
1981 poll indicated that only I8 percent would support the
use of armed force for the defense of the safety of the sea
lanes.
The severe attitude take by the Soviet Union in the
1977 territorial fishing rights negotiations, the massive
Soviet military buildup in Asia, and the invasion of Afghan-
istan have all served to heighten Japan's perception of the
threat. The Soviet Pacific Fleet now stands at over one
and one-half million tons, twice that of the U.S. Seventh
Fleet. In addition, the appearance of the aircraft carrier
Minsk and modern missile cruisers give the Soviets a power
projection capability previously enjoyed only by the U.S.
carrier task groups. The new amphibious vessel Ivan Rogov
indicated an increased Soviet emphasis on amphibious capa-
bility in the Pacific. Practice landings in the Japanese-
claimed but Soviet-occupied southern Kurile islands and
troop buildups on these islands (approximately 6,000 troops
with tanks, artillery, and attack helicopters in addition to
p o
2,000 to 5,000 KGB border guards)" have effectively shot
down the theory that the Soviets pose no amphibious threat
to Jap^n.
Many Japanese regard Korea as the key to Japan's
security. In this light, continuing political tension and
uncertainty on the peninsula resulting from Park's
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assassination and Chun's consolidation of power have contrib-
uted to Japanese security fears and have been instrumental
in affecting changes in the public attitude toward defense.
This is another factor encouraging a more favorable position
toward the U.S. -Japan Mutual Security Treaty as are public
statements by China encouranging Japan to increase defense
spending.
4 . Decision-Making and the Government
a. Method
Political decision-making in Japan is accom-
plished by three major bodies. The first is the Diet which
has been firmly controlled since 1955 by the Liberal-
Democratic Party (LDP). A large role is also played by the
government's ministerial bureaucracy. In the bureaucracy,
positions are filled by appointment. Because of the his-
torical dominance of the LDP, the bureaucracy has been very
stable and conservative and is sympathetic to LDP objectives.
Some 70 percent of the bills submitted to the Diet are drafted
by this bureaucracy and the great majority of these bills
29
are passed. The third element in the decision-making triad
is the general public which, as the electorate, determines
the party in power and sets broad limits within which the
party and the government can function.
These three decision-making bodies are tied
closely together by the ringisei system of business and
bureaucracy which stresses consensual decision-making as
opposed to the Western method of majority rule. The
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Japanese use the term ringisei to describe the methodology
of decision-making, or perhaps more accurately, the model
30for policy evolution. In the ringisei model, a policy
statement is drafted in the middle levels of the bureau-
cracy. This draft is then circulated within that level of
the hierarchy where revisions are discussed until a consen-
sus is reached. Then the document is forwarded to the next
higher level in the bureaucracy where again a consensus must
be reached. Only when the document has completed its intri-
cate Journey through this web to the highest administrators
and has been approved, is the decision considered to have
been made. Although some segments of modern Japanese society
are beginning to tolerate the Western type of majority rule
decision-making, the traditional consensual decision-making
is the most widely used and accepted form.
Herman Kahn illustrates this systemi in his four
step description for the passage of a controversial bill:
. . . .(1) the development of a recommended course of
action among the conservative groups (usually some private
consensus building among business, the relevant bureau-
cratic interests, and LDP leaders); (2) the explanation
(or leaking) of the basis for this recommendation to
the media, who present it to the public as a trial
balloon; (3) the reaction of opposition groups, some-
times through the media, but increasingly through debate
and negotiations in Diet committees; and finally, (4)
the development of whatever compromises appear to be
required under the circumstances . 31
Because consensus decision-making dominates the
political process, the floor of the Diet becomes little more
than a formality with the real work and decisions coming
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from the committee structure. These committees, whose com-
position normally represents the party distribution in the
Diet, are often paralleled by corresponding committees in
the LDP party structure. Again, one sees consensual decision-
making as the Party committee formulates its policy on a given
issue which is then brought to the Diet committee where the
issues are discussed until a final compromise product is
ready for presentation on the Diet floor.
b . Position
The official Japanese position on the overall
scope of defense matters can be found in the Defense of
Japan , the annual White Paper published by the Japanese
Defense Agency. This document states that there has been
no change in the basic premise of the national defense from
the policies adopted by Cabinet approval in 1957. It
asserts that the goal of the ongoing Defense Program Outline
is, "To be capable of rebuffing cases of limited and small-
scale aggression..." and also states that, "the primary
mission of the Maritime Self-Defense Forces are (sic) to
defend Japan against seaborne invasions and to secure sea
lanes in the seas around Japan." The White Paper stresses
the purely defensive nature of the Japanese Self-Defense
Forces and strongly asserts that no personnel will be sent
abroad for the purpose of any military action including the
support of the United Nations. -^-^ This concept is not at
all new. As far back as 195^ the House of Councillors passed
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a resolution maintaining that the overseas deployment of the
armed, forces is unconstitutional. In 1971, Defense Minister
Nishimura stated, "In my view, the use of military means to
protect overseas interests is not only anachronistic but
useless...! can assure you that no Self-Defense Force
unit or personnel will be sent overseas to protect Japan's
35
economic interests by force.' Extreme tension in the
Middle East in I98O renewed dialogue on overseas deployment
of forces. The Suzuki government took the stand that Japan
could legally defend its merchant shipping on the high seas
if required, but declined an invitation to participate in a
multinational supervisory fleet for the northern Indian
Ocean.
Concerning Japan's ability to protect its sea
lanes, official statements have been consistently negative.
In 1970, then Director General of Defense Nakasone stated
that any guarding of sea lanes in the vicinity of the Malacca
Straits would be completely outside of Japan's purview and
out of the question for the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense
Forces. Four years later, then Director General Maruyama
explained that
:
We have no such thoughts (of patrolling the Malacca
Straits to protect Japanese shipping) because our mari-
time patrol limit is under 1,000 nautical miles. Argu-
ments may arise that we would be able to protect all
the ships coming to Japan from submarines—that of
course is not possible. 37
The Japanese Defense Agency has normally avoided discussions
of sea lane defense by the MSDF but has expressed serious
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doubts that the MSDF can provide autonomous protection. A
recent statement explained that the MSDF will share with the
U.S. Navy the responsibility of anti-submarine warfare and
convoy escort in the sea area. This area is generally
acknowledged to consist of coastal waters extending 300
nautical miles (NM) into the Pacific Ocean, 200NM into the
South China Sea, and 150NM into the Sea of Japan. In
addition, the sea area includes two major sea lanes within
lOOONM of Japan (to approximately 20 degrees North Latitude)
and the sea area between them forming a rough triangle. The
western sea lane extends from Osaka on a line toward Taiwan
and then toward the Malacca Strait while the eastern lane
runs from Tokyo through the Bonin Islands and toward
Australia. "'
A process of slow and incremental change is
evident in an examination of official statements. The gen-
eral tone of each successive White Paper has placed increas-
ing emphasis on the credibility of the Soviet threat.
Bernard Gordon sees the departure from the traditional five-
year Defense Build-Up Plans, which were based orv building
toward preannounced goals, in favor of the open-ended
National Defense Program Outline, as a possible signal of
39
upcoming policy changes. Prime Minister Suzuki's
announced goal of attaining the Program Outline goals by the
end of fiscal 1987 invites speculation on a follow-up program
even though the Prime Minister has indicated he has no
intention of revising the 1975 Outline.
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Sadao Seno and James Auer point out that while
the civilian planners of the Defense Agency have been
"...oriented strictly to protect the nation against invading
enemy ships..." the uniformed leadership of the MSDF believes
41that they must "...ensure Japan's free use of the seas."
Osamu Kaihara claims that the MSDF has already " . . ^established
the maintenance of the sea communications routes as its most
important and basic duty, instead of the defense of the four
42
main islands." An underlying themie expressed by many writers
is that of government indecision or nonpolicy concerning
defense. The basic feeling is that the government, while
becoming increasingly concerned with the threat, has not made
any decision as to what type or how much military it wants
and is not willing to close off any option. James Auer best
summarizes this school of thought in saying:
The Government has remained content to allow civilian
defense planners to put forth their view on a lim.ited,
effective anti-invasion security force; but it has also
allowed the MSDF leadership, supported by conservative
politicians and business elements, to build some long
leadtime naval vessels which could be used for a future
oceangoing navy able to protect Japan's interests in
local and more distant waters. ^B
It seems that the members of the military estab-
lishments in almost every country v;ould like to see their
nation and more specifically their own branch of service
increase its power and im.portance. However, because the
National Defense Agency is structured to allovj total civilian
control, it is unlikely that military opinions will
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have much weight in government decision-making. The 1978
firing of General Kirisu and the I98I firing of General
Takeda for making public statements challenging civilian
control bear this out. John Smmerson explained that the
military is buffered by bureaucracy and "...neither the
opposition nor the LDP has any interest in increasing the
political voice of the military in Japan. As a consequence
issues will be made without significant influence from the
uniformed leaders of the SDP .
"
5 . Liberal-Democratic Party
The Liberal-Democratic Party has held power since
its formation in 1955- During the period from 1976 to 1979
it was unable to maintain a clear majority of Diet seats,
but a landslide victory in the I98O elections following the
death of Prime Minister Ohira clearly reestablished LDP
dominance giving them 284 of the 511 seats in the Lower
House. Despite this apparent superiority, numerous factions
within the LDP, each with its own leadership and following,
diffuses the party's political power. The ideological views
of the various factions range from ultraconservative to
liberal, although they are predominately middle-line
conservative. Views on defense issues range from right-
wing support for a massive and rapid defense build-up to
left-wing support for continuing but slower growth. In
general, the LDP favors a continued and gradual expansion of
military power but it does not feel compelled to set eventual
limits at this time.
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The internal structure of the LDP is well organi-
zed for policy development. Two party committees, the
National Defense Division (NDD) and the Investigation Com-
mission on National Security (ICNS) are responsible for
defense policy development. The NDD, concerned primarily
with budgetary and technical policies, works closely with
the Defense Agency while the ICNS has jurisdiction over the
international, economic, social and political implications of
national security policy. A policy recomjnendation from
either of these committees would be forwarded to the Policy
Affairs Research Council (PARC) and then to the Executive
Council of the LDP before receiving the party's seal of
approval. Here, as in Diet committees, compromise and con-
sensus among factions plays a substantial role in shaping
the final product
.
The influence of business interests on LDP
policy making is substantial. In the field of arms produc-
tion and sales however, opposing segments within the business
community have essentially nullified business influence.
Defense contractors lobby for a stronger defense and for the
liberalization of export restrictions on arms. On the other
hand, there is countering pressure to maintain a very low
defense profile for fear of antagonizing trade partners with
an allusion to the militarism of World War II.
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6 . Opposition Parties
Opposition parties, taken as Individual power struc-
tures, lack the strength to make a significant Impact on
decision-making and policy development. Following the 198O
elections the distribution of the 511 Diet seats in the Lower
House was as follows: LDP-284; Japan Socialist (JSP)-107;
Komeito (Clean Government Party )-33; Democratic Socialist
Party (DSP)-32; Japan Communist Party (JCP)-29; and the New
Liberal Club (NLC)-12. Although the opposition parties lack
individual strength, they play a significant role in Japanese
politics by posing an effective check to the LDP by forming
coalitions, encouraging public demonstrations and support on
specific issues, and in mounting mass media campaigns. They
also play an important role in debate and in compromise
negotiations on the Diet floor and in the committees.
The largest opposition party, the JSP, officially
opposes the U.S. -Japan Mutual Security Treaty (MST) and
favors its abrogation while hoping to establish increased
solidarity with the non-aligned nations. They also want to
reduce and eventually dismantle the SDF but will "take public
opinion into consideration." This qualification leaves
the door open for a future policy change in the event the JSP
should gain power and realize the necessity of maintaining
the SDF. In fact, a 1977 poll commissioned by the Prime
Minister's Office revealed that 78 percent of the JSP
supporters (not necessarily party members) polled favored
maintaining the SDF. Furthermore, the chairman of the JSP
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announced that if the LDP failed to get a majority in the
1980 election his party would be agreeable to forming a
coalition government that would support the MST and the SDF
.
The Komeito was formed in 1964 as the political
party of the Buddhist sect, Sokagakkai . In 1970 it formally
severed its religious ties but has remained linked to Soka-
gakkai in the public perception. In 1978, the Komeito
shifted its stand and publically supported the SDF but would
limit its responsibilities to "defensive defense" (as opposed
to "offensive defense"). The most recent policy change has
been a reversal in its stand to abolish the Japan-U.S.
Mutual Security Treaty. The May 198I shift will admit the
constitutionality of the SDF and the MST in a move that
party chairman Yoshikatsu Takeiri said was "only natural to
take a realistic stand of agreeing to the continued existence
of the security treaty and the maintenance of the Self-
49Defense forces .
"
The DSP was formed in I960 as a conservative
splinter faction of the JSP. They have consistently sup-
ported the MST and favor a strong and totally self-reliant
SDF with popular consent and under the principle of civilian
control
.
The JCP recognizes Japan's right to self-defense
but seeks security through denunciation of the MST and a
policy of unarmed neutrality. The JCP opposes hegomonism
of any power and favors the dissolution of all military
alliances including NATO and the Warsaw Pact.
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The MLC splintered from the LDP in 1976 as a reac-
tion to scandals and corruption rather than as an ideological
movement. Because of this origin, its stand on defense issues
barely differs from the LDP.^°
7 . Business and Industry
Volumes have been written on the relationship of
big business to Japanese politics and government, but Edwin
0. Reischauer summed it up in one paragraph.
The Japanese have often described the symbiotic relation-
ship between politicians, bureaucrats, and business
leaders in terms of Janken, the paper-scissors-stone game
of Japanese children. The conservative politicians de-
pend on the money of business; business depends on the
administrative rulings of the bureaucracy; and the
bureaucracy depends on the political decisions and Diet
votes of the politicians . 51
These three groups closely interact for even routine matters
and policy decisions are never made without prior consul-
tation. There are several reasons for this cohesiveness
.
Many individual members have strong family ties through
marriage and adoption to elites in other groups. Moreover,
a great majority of the ruling elite are graduates of the
University of Tokyo. These ties may be likened to, but are
many magnitudes greater, than those found among the "Eastern
establishment" in the United States.
Japan has placed considerable emphasis on the domes-
tic production of defense material. In 1969 Japan was making
97 percent of its own ammunition and 84 percent of its
52
aircraft, tanks, guns, and ships. In 1977, of a total of
458.3 billion yen in awarded defense contracts, only 22.2

53billion were for imported goods. With a defense budget of
2,446.6 billion yen for 198I it is not unreasonable to expect
900 billion yen in defense contracts to be awarded to domestic
firms. It must be noted however, that for the majority of
the weapons-producing industries, defense contracts repre-
sent only a small percentage of their total output, with
the largest producers in terms of total weapons contracts,
tending to be less dependent on defense contracts. The top
six arms producers are shown in the table on page 68.
Formally representing the business community in the
political sphere are four principle organizations. 3y far
the strongest and most influential is the Federation of
Economic Organizations or Keidanren . Membership is limited
to big business and large government corporations. Founded
in 1946, Keidanren represents over 8OO of the nation's
largest corporations. Representing the small and medium-
sized industries is Nissho , the Japan Chamber of Commerce
and Industry. Nissho promotes the general well-being of
Japanese industry. The Japan Committee for Economic Devel-
opment ( Keizai Doyukai ) was founded in 1946 by a group of
young executives who were dedicated to rebuilding a shattered
Japan. This group has maintained a low profile in defense
issues but is committed to a progressive economy and
revitalized capitalism. The Nikkeiren (Japan Federation of
Employers' Association) was originally founded to counter
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considerably and the Association now works to promote har-
mony and the best interests of both labor and management.
Within the Keidanren organization, the Defense
Production Committee (DPC) is tasked with promoting the ag-
gregate interests of the defense industries. The DPC,
although funded by the Japanese Munitions Industry Associa-
tion, has widespread support among business leaders. In
fact, in 1972 the President and six of the seven Vice
Presidents of Keidanren were members of the Executive Council
of the DPC.^^
The business community is, overall, in favor of a
stronger defense. The head of Nikkeiren, Takeshi Sakurada,
commented, "Japan should produce more defense arms for itself
...and spend every penny it can on defense.""^ The
DPC has asked the government to double spending on defense-
oriented research and development and Nissho has announced
that it is working with Keidanren to relax the ban on arms
58
exports, specifically on warships for export trade.
The charge is often heard that the DPC and Keidanren are
at the heart of a powerful military-industrial complex. In
fact, although the DPC does lobby extensively for the
defense industry, its influence on policy and programs
remains modest. Defense production accounts for such a
small percentage of the major corporations' total output
that at best, only marginal returns on defense are realized.
While the benefits of research and development, technological
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spillover, and the prospect of future contracts is not to
be denied, it is not likely that the business community will
provide the impetus for a greatly stepped-up defense effort.
The majority of Japan's businessmen remain very reluctant to
spend more on defense.
8. Mass Media
The mass media, especially the newspapers, reach a
great number of people and are extremely influential in the
political process. The Japanese are very well read as
evidenced by the UN Statistical Yearbook 1970 report that
showed 503 copies of daily newspaper circulation per 1,000
population. This ranked second in the world being surpassed
only by Sweden with 528. By comparison the United States
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registered 305 copies per 1,000 population. The three
major daily newspapers ( Asahi , Mainichi , and Yomiuri ) each
employ hugh staffs who are permanently assigned to covering
prominent politicians, government offices and business
groups. These reporters normally constitute a formal press
club which is assigned office space in government buildings,
have daily press interviews and on occasion informal evening
meetings at restaurants or in the officials' homes. The
intimacy and comradarie established by the press clubs pro-
vide avenues by which the officials can present their views
to the public and at the same time receive public opinion
pressure. This same system however, inhibits hardline
investigative reporting which has played a significant role
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in American politics. However this style of reporting is on
• • - • 4- ^0the upswing m japan m recent years.
C. FOREIGN POLICY
1 . General
Donald Hellmann commented, "Japanese foreign policy
is like a bamboo thicket: full and attractive in appearance,
resilient in all kinds of weather, but lacking in real sub-
stance and crowding out all around it that are reached by
C -1
its roots." The primary concerns of Japan's foreign policy
have been: the preservation of her security through a close
relationship with the United States; a policy of avoiding
controversy in international affairs; and a single-minded
goal to establish economic parity with the West. Other
important issues to Japan's foreign policy are her access
to oil and raw materials and the development of export
markets for her manufactured goods.
As Japan has expanded her economic intercourse in
Asia, trade and investment have also brought resentment.
The popular image of Japan is becoming that of an "economic
animal intent on pursuing her economic interest exclusively
52
at the expense of those economically underdeveloped countries."
The "ugly American" is becoming the "ugly Japanese." The
importation of Japanese capital and technology is viewed by
many countries as contributing to domestic economic instabil-





These trade requirements and her economic power are
forcing Japan out of anonymity and into the spotlight of
international politics. Never before has a nation achieved
such a level of economic power without corresponding mili-
tary and political power. Having reached their main goal of
economic development, Japan is at a crossroad with no map.
As Herman Kahn put it, "Thus, with no new model to follow
and no available design of its own, the country is drifting,
not only economically but socially, politically, and cultural-
ly as well." Resource procurement, the Soviet threat and
changing attitudes toward the U.S. security stance seem to
be waking Japan up to the necessity to assess her situation
and choose a path. Minister of Foreign Affairs Okita summed
up this view in a speech at the Foreign Correspondents Club
on January 23, 1980:
As such, Japanese foreign policy is currently undergoing
an important evolution. Very briefly, we are moving into
a new phase of heightening awareness of Japan within the
international political context and increasing willingness
to act in accordance with that awareness. Some foreign
observers have in the past characterized Japan as an eco-
nomic giant and a political dwarf. Japan in the future
should gradually narrow this disparity between our eco-
nomic and political international involvements.^^
2 . United States
From the Occupation to I960, Japan was totally
dependent on the United States for her national security and
defense. Coinciding with the first revision of the Mutual
Security Treaty in I960, a buildup in the Ground Self-
Defense Forces was the main political leverage employed in
bargaining for the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Japan. From
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this beginning, Japan began to slowly develop her self-
defense capability while remaining under the overall protec-
tion of the U.S. and the U.S. "strategic umbrella." The
wording of the Mutual Security Treaty stresses defending
Japan "against any armed attack" and plays a significant
role in Japanese defense strategy. The Mutual Security
Treaty does not obligate any Japanese response in the event
of an attack on the U.S. but neither does it provide for U.S.
protection for any contingency short of direct assault on
the Japanese home islands. The cost of this security umbrella
was the basing and transit rights for U.S. ships and aircraft
in Japanese territory and the use of those bases and port
facilities
.
American policy in Asia since the announcement of
the Nixon Doctrine in July 1969, has shifted from U.S.
domination to an expectation of self-reliance on the part of
Asian nations and from a focus on Southeast Asia to China
and the northeast. U.S. troop strength in Asia dropped from
640,000 to 140,000 in ten years and naval forces have been
more than halved. Tne New Pacific Doctrine announced by
President Ford in December 1975 emphasized peace and stabil-
ity in Asia through a balance of power between the United
States, the Soviet Union, China and Japan. This policy was
continued by President Carter with the normalization of
relations with China and with Japan's inclusion as the
65
"northern anchor" of American defense strategy. Prom
preliminary indications, it would appear that President
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Reagan will pursue the same basic policies emphasizirxg a
buildup of overall U.S. military capability, continued pres-
sure on Japan to assume a larger role in regional security,
and further development of Sino-U.S. relations.
While there is no reason to suspect any major change
in U. 3 . -Japanese relations in the short term, there are two
contending schools of thought concerning long-term economic
66developments. The neo-Malthusian school feels that as
resources become scarcer and the struggle to control those
resources becomes more intense, resource-poor Japan may
become an albatross around the necks of her allies. The
neo-Malthusians urge a gradual loosening of bilateral ties
leading toward a final position of more economic and mili-
tary independence. Conversely, the Post-Industrial school
contends that Japanese growth will continue and that Japan
will quite possibly establish herself as a military as well
as an economic .superpower. Should this come about, Japan
would become the key to power distribuiton in Asia and as
such, the Post-Industrialists argue that the closest political
and economic ties should be cultivated.
The defeat of the United States in Vietnam, increased
U.S. naval commitments in the Indian Ocean which has drawn
down the Pacific force levels, and the buildup of Soviet
ground and naval forces in Asia have raised Japanese
apprehensions concerning the U.S. commitment to the Mutual
Security Treaty. There was widespread feeling both in Japan
and in the United States that the U.S. had lost confidence
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in itself as a world leader and as a military power. Public
sentiment for military noninvolvement clashed with feelings
of moral obligations as crises in Iran and Afghanistan
developed. Former Prime Minister Ohira expressed a sympathe-
tic understanding for the U.S. position:
The U.S. has for too long been getting only requests
and demands and. complaints from the rest of the world.
The other nations never felt that America needed help or
cooperation or warm compassion from the others. I don't
think the United States can keep getting these complaints
forever. It's ngt Santa Claus. It cannot just keep
giving forever. °°
Relationships over the past several years have been
characterized by American expectations of Japanese support
in international politics and policies and in an increased
Japanese role in regional defense resonsibilities . Japanese
attitudes have been characterized by a determination to
maintain an independent and pragmatic policy founded entirely
on Japanese national interests.
These differing attitudes have produced frequent
clashes in the foreign policy field, and when coupled with
domestic and trade issues, have produced a roller coaster
effect in bilateral relations. The trade crisis of 1977
culminated a period of growing U.S. frustration with trade
imbalance primarily due to rising oil prices. Japan declined
to support U.S. proposed sanctions against Iran after the
seizure of the embassy which further exacerbated the situa-
tion. Condemnation of the Soviet Union for the Afghan
invasion and support for the Olympic boycott served to ease
tensions temporarily, but trade questions, this time with
75

automobile quotas, again came into the picture. The most
recent series of disputes involving the collision of a
Japanese merchant ship and a U.S. ballistic missile submarine,
statements by former Embassador Edwin 0. Reischauer concern-
ing the presence of nuclear weapons aboard U.S. ships while
in Japanese ports and territorial waters, and the use of the
term "alliance" in a joint communique following Prime Minister
Suzuki's talks with President Reagan, have put U . S . -Japanese
relations on very thin ice and have seriously jeopardized
the stability of Suzuki's regime on the domestic front.
The subjects of Japanese rearmament and providing
for autonomous self-defense have long been major issues
affecting Japan-U.S. relations. The initial push by the
U.S. was the creation of a 75,000-man police force that would
free U.S. manpower for utilization in the Korean War.
Through the rest of the 1950s and 1960s, the pressure sub-
sided significantly. With the announcement of the Nixon
Doctrine in 1969, the U.S. embarked on a course to convince
and pressure Japan into a significant increase in her military
and self-defense capability, and a larger role in the regional
security of northeast Asia.
Former Defense Secretary Schlesinger urged that
Japanese defense spending be increased to two percent of
the GNP . U.S. civilian and military authorities have urged
imporvement in the areas of antisubmarine warfare, air defense,
and logistics support. Lacking however, has been any




expected and what specific functions should be emphasized. ^
In essence, the U.S. demands have simply been for increased
defense expenditures and for the Japanese to assume a larger
share of their self-defense.
Japanese responses to date have included gradual
increases in defense spending which tripled between 1962 and
1971, and again tripled between 1971 and 1978 in spite of
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remaining at less than one percent of the GNP . A gradual
building program has been in effect but recent emphasis has
been on equipment modernization rather than further procure-
ment. Prime Minister Suzuki has announced that Japan will
meet the objectives stated in the 1976 Defense Program outline
by fiscal I987.
Suggestions from the U.S. have included Japanese
participation in a Joint "Pacific Patrol Fleet," that Japan
construct two aircraft carriers and lease them to the U.S.,
and that Japan increase her ASW capability sufficiently ro
be capable of blockading the^ major straits through the
Japanese islands and escorting convoys in the vicinity of
71Japan. Most recently Defense Secretary Weinberger repeated
a U.S. plea that Japan increase her defense budget.
The whole issue of defense spending .seems to stem
from differences in the philosophical approaches to defense
and security that are operative in the U.S. and Japan. In
the United States, the solution to the security of the Pacific
is seen in terms of the ability to marshal sufficient
military strength to neutralize any threat. Consequently,
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rhetoric originating in the United States emphasizes defense
and military capability. The Japanese take a much broader
view of Asian security. Their philosophy contends that eco-
nomic strength and political goodwill are Just as important
as military strength and all must be considered in total
when formulating a security policy. In their rhetoric, the
Japanese bring this point home by consistently considering
defense as one of the elements of the wider concept of security
The Comprehensive Security Policy, as developed by
the Comprehensive National Security Council, an advisory
group to the Prime Minister, further emphasizes this attitude.
The CSP calls for an outlay of up to five percent of the GNP
for security. Included in that package are funds for foreign
aid, resource development, cultural exchange, and economic
development. Expenditures for defense, as included in the
CSP, would remain at less than one percent of GNP.
In an effort to improve cooperation and understanding
on military issues between the U.S. and Japan, the Japanese
government, in late 1973, adopted the Guidelines of Japan-
U.S. Defense Cooperation which established the Japan-U.S.
Subcommittee on Security Cooperation. The Guidelines cover
three basic areas: (1) posture for deterring aggression,
(2) responses to an armed attack against -Japan, and (3)
cooperation in situations outside of Japan that would
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seriously impact the security of Japan. Within the purview
of the Guidelines and for the first time in the history of
the Mutual Security Treaty, drafts of joint operation plans
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are being written, procedures for cooperation in intelli-
gence and logistics support activities, and standard defense
measures are being devised. In addition, a joint command
center is being planned which will allow direct and contin-
uous coordination between the U.S. and Japan in time of
emergency and will also be useful for Joint exercises and
73training.
3 . Soviet Union
The 1980 Defense White Paper spells out the Soviet
threat to Japanese security in terms that leave no doubt
that the USSR is the number one concern of Japanese forces.
Japan's contemporary distrust and dislike of the Soviet
Union began with Moscow's abrogation of the 19^1 Russo-
Japanese Neutrality Pact in the closing days of World War II.
This dispute has been fueled by unfriendly and non-cooperative
acts by both parties on a continuing basis.
Issues involving fishing rights have been at the
heart of the most bitter disputes between Japan and the
Soviet Union dating back to the 1930s when the Soviets
accused Japanese fishermen of sabotage and espionage
activities. Following World War II, primarily as a matter
of military security, Japanese fishing rights were totally
restricted to coastal areas. Although the San Francisco
Peace Treaty of 1951 provided for the opening of the Sea of
Okhotsk, the Bering Sea, and coastal areas near the Kurile
Islands to Japanese fishermen, the Soviet Union did not sign
the Treaty. Negotiations dragged on for over four years
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finally culminating in a fishing agreement in 1956. The
next two decades were highlighted by frequent accusations of
violations on both sides. Disputes resulted from specific
limitations and interpretations of the agreement and by the
Soviet seizure of Japanese fishing boats for alleged
agreement violations. In June 1975, a new agreement was
signed primarily aimed at resolving disputes involving
Soviet vessels off the coast of Japan. During the next two
years the controversy centered around the Soviet seizure of
Japanese ships. From 1975 through the end of August 1976,
7 51,553 vessels were seized along with 12,858 crewmen. The
widespread adoption of the 200 nautical mile Exclusive
Economic Zones (EEZ), established by the Law of the Sea
Conference, made it imperative that Japan pursue a new fish-
ing agreement with the Soviet Union in order to maintain her
fishing industry. On May 27, 1977, the Soviet-Japanese
Fisheries Agreement was signed. The Agreement requires the
licensing of Japanese vessels operating in Soviet waters,
imposes strict quotas on the catch, and provides for the
inspection and seizure, if warranted, of Japanese vessels.
The hard line taken by the Soviets in negotiations leading
to the agreement is widely resented in Japan but is tolera-
ted in deference to the necessity of obtaining the provided
fishing rights.
The Northern Territories issue centers on the islands
of Etorofu, Shikotan, Habomai, and Kunashiri, off the north-
7 fi
eastern tip of Hokkaido . The Soviet Union occupied the
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islands at the end of World War II and recently increased its
troop strength to just under one division and is upgrading
harbor facilities and airfields on the islands. The Soviet
claim to the islands stems from wartime agreements amiong the
Allies on territorial division and on the San Francisco
Treaty of 1951 in which Japan renounced any claim to the
Kurile Islands. Japan contends that Shikotan and Habomai
are offshore islands of Hokkaido and not geologically a
part of the Kuriles. Furthermore, Etorofu and Kunashiri are
not included in previous treaties concerning the Kuriles such
as the Shimoda Treaty of 1855 which specified that the divid-
ing line fell north of Etorofu (the northernmost disputed
island), nor were they included in the Treaty of St. Peters-
burg in 1875 in which the Kurile Islands were ceded to Japan
and were listed by name. All islands lying north of Etorofu
and Kunashiri were listed by name indicating no previous
Soviet claim regarding the islands south of that boundary line
In i960, the Northern Territories were held out as a
political carrot to Japan in an effort by the Soviets to
entice Japan away from signing the Mutual Security Treaty
with the United States. Similar hints have been forwarded
in various negotiations since that time, but with the estab-
lishment of more permanent military facilities in the islands,
it would appear that the Soviets now intend to occupy the
islands for some time to come.
Soviet intervention in Afghanistan evoked widespread
Japanese condemnation and has been cited as one of the
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factors responsible for Japan's trend toward a stronger de-
fense posture. The disclosure of the I9S0 spy case involving
Japanese military officers and Soviet embassy officials also
had an abrasive effect on relations as did the I98I transit
through Japanese territorial waters of a crippled Soviet
nuclear submarine without prior permission from Japanese
authorities
.
Soviet protest has been provoked by Japan's handling
of the Soviet iMIG-25 pilot's defection in 1976 when return
of the aircraft was delayed until after U.S. and Japanese
experts could make detailed studies of the aircraft.
Japanese positions in international relations, specifically
the signing of the 1978 agreement with China, continued
close ties to the United States and the reliance on the
Mutual Security Treaty have been detrimental to any improve-
ment in Soviet-Japanese relations.
On the other hand, before the escalation in tension
in the early 1970s, very promising trade negotiations were
beginning to unfold. The Soviet desire for Japanese capital
and technology in return for much-needed Siberian resources
of iron ore, coal, lumber, and oil may still play a signifi-
cant role in future relations. The Japanese have always
taken a pragmatic course in economic matters and there
remains a definite possibility that obstacles could be over-
come to greatly increase trade with the Soviets. Ever since
the 1973 oil shocks, Japan has been pursuing actions to
widely diversify her sources of raw materials in an effort to
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prevent a repetition of those events. Regardless of the close
proximity and relatively low transportation costs of Soviet
resources, there is no reason to believe, as some writers
warn, that Japan would allow herself to get into a position
of becoming dependent on the Soviet Union for resources.
In the strictly military sense, the Soviets view the
Japanese military forces in much the same light that they
evaluate NATO forces in Europe, that is, as a combined
threat in support of U.S. forces. As such, the Soviet's
view Japan's changing attitude toward defense and her agree-
ments with the United States and with China as a unified
threat to Soviet security.
4 . People's Republic of China
The signing of the 1978 Treaty of Peace and Friend-
ship dramatically changed the complexion of the Asian politi-
cal balance and testified to Japan's newfound willingness to
take an increased role in world and regional politics. In
signing the treaty, Japan and China agreed to lay aside, at
least temporarily, "minor" disagreements such as territorial
claims to the Senkakus and differences in political ideology.
China's primary interest in the entente is in recruiting a
new partner to their united anti-Soviet American-Japanese-
Chinese interrelationships.
Both nations stand to gain substantial trade benefits
although recent outlooks are not nearly so optimistic as
the initial predictions. After the initial opening of trade
relations, which resulted in somewhat of a scramble for the
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fabled "Chinese market," Beijing restricted its policy on
foreign investments by cancelling agreements and rearranging
its financial priorities. Consequently, Japanese investors
are proceeding cautiously following their bitter experiences.
Japanese capital and technology will be employed in
a number of projects including long-term loans, oil explora-
tion, railway improvements and construction of a steel mill.
Chinese oil exports to Japan were scheduled to reach 15
million tons annually by 1982, more than doubling the 197S
levels; however, production delays may reduce those forecasts.
In addition, Japanese arms manufacturers, specifically
Mitsubishi and Ishikawa-Harima Heavy Industries, are lobbying
for a relaxation of arms export laws to allow them to go into
production for Chinese markets.
As early as 1973, Chinese leaders have commented
that Japan needs the "American nuclear umbrella" provided
77by the Mutual Security. As China's relations with both the
U.S. and Japan warmed, the Chinese have expressed increasingly
stronger approval of Japan's military buildup and have
publically endorsed the 1979 White Paper which for the first
time named the Soviet Union as a direct threat to Japanese
y O
security. The Chinese strongly support an increasing
Japanese role in regional security (as long as the recognized
mutual threat is the Soviet Union) and have publically urged




Korea has traditionally been the stepping stone for
invasion between Japan and the mainland. A long history of
strife and colonial dominance have created deep-seated
resentment between the Korean and Japanese people. One
Korean intellectual described the history of Korean per-
ceptions of Japan as a series of four pictures. At the begin-
ning of the century, a savage and unfeeling Japanese came to
plunder. In the next frame, the criminal cowers before the
American liberator. Then comes the unscrupulous nouveau
riche seeking profit out of Korean suffering and war. In
the final frame, the Japanese is arrogant and denies the Korean
79
a right to fish for a living. Public opinion polls show
that similar attitudes are held by both peoples. Diplomatic
normalization in 1965 has contributed greatly to soothe past
wounds and economic relations have blossomed, but there is
still a glaring lag in cultural and social relations.
There are opposing views concerning the importance
of Korean security to the defense posture of Japan. Many
authors consider Korea to be a "dagger pointed at Japan's
belly." They feel that the security of Japan and Korea
are intertwined such that barring exceptional circumstances,
the fall of one will lead to the fall of the other. An
opposing view is held by Edwin 0. Reischauer who stated:
A united Communist Korea, if it came about without the
loss of American face and credibility, would be a rela-
tively easy matter for the Japanese to adjust to. A
broad sea border would still exist between them, and
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Korea, and they are already used to having the majority
of the neighboring peoples under Communist rule.82
Regardless of outlook, a unified Communist Korea
would open a new threat axis supplementing the Soviet threat
in the Kuriles. While this may not be the determining
factor of Japan's future, it would certainly have considerable
impact on the Japanese attitude toward a strong military.
South Korea and Japan are closely linked by economic
interdependence. South Korea is the second largest importer
of Japanese goods and Japan has become Korea's primary source
of foreign capital, accounting for two-thirds of her total
O o
overseas investments.
In spite of economic dependence and security rela-
tionships. South Korea remains ambivalent toward Japan's
defense posture. She would like to see a strong Japan but
only strong enough to assume a role of greater self-reliance
and by so doing, free American assets that could be called on
to defend Korea.
6. Southeast Asia and ASEAN
Southeast Asia and ASEAN are extremely important to
Japan as sources of raw materials and by their geographic
positions, guardians of the sea lanes through which their
shipping must pass. The Philippines provide ^43 percent of
Japan's copper and 25 percent of her bauxite is mined in
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Indonesia. Eighteen percent of Japan's oil is provided by
Indonesia, Malaysia and Brunei. Total trade figures




Prosperity is also becoming a dilemma. The main
fears in Southeast Asia are Japanese dominance through eco-
nomic power and the possibility that because Japan is so
poor in resources, she will try to obtain them by military
force. The memories of World War II occupation have not
been erased and the current Japanese practice of economic
interchange with limited cultural or social exchange has
done nothing to change these perceptions. The general public
has little contact with the Japanese except by seeing the
Japanese businessmen and wealthy tourists, and by seeing
Q r
Japanese products that they cannot afford to buy.
In this light, the Southeast Asian nations are
extremely wary of any strengthening of Japanese military
forces, notwithstanding Prime Minister Pukuda's stated
policy that Japan will never become a military power, that
Japan would work to deepen mutual understanding in South-
east Asia, and that Japan would contribute to the peace and
87prosperity of Southeast Asia as a whole. The Southeast
Asian countries feel that if there is to be cooperation
and prosperity with Japan, Japan should be wary not to be
seen as exporting industries that pollute the environment,
exploiting cheap labor in developing countries, or using the






IV. INTERNATIONAL TRADE, THE KEY TO JAPAN ^S STRENGTH
Japan is the world's largest importer of raw materials
and is commonly acknowledged to have the third largest GNP.
Even with a substantially reduced growth rate, Japan's econ-
om.y will surpass the Soviet Union by 1985 and according to
one respected analyst, has already become the second largest
producer in the world. As Japan faces the 1980s she is
coming to the realization that her traditional style of
anonymity is no longer possible and that she must take a
larger role in world politics. Japan has becom.e a superpower
without the development of extensive military forces to en-
sure her security and has instead relied on the assurances
of the Mutual Security Treaty with the United States and on
a foreign policy of political noninvolvement . As the U.S.
is becoming less willing and less able to utilize military
solutions in regional confrontations, the Japanese are becom-
ing ever more aware of the fragile nature of their economy
and the vulnerability of the sea lanes of communication.
A. RESOURCE DEPENDENCE
As an industrial superpov;er, Japan's economy is tied to
the free movement of m.aterial in and out of the country via
ocean routes. In 1968, Japan imported over 5C0 million tons
of goods, of which 200 million tons were oil. Over 30 percent
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of her v;heat and copper, and 95 percent of her cotton, wool,
nickel, bauxite, iron ore, and 99.^ percent of her oil was
2imported. Four broad traffic routes carried the bulk of
this traffic (Figure 4-1). Oil was primarily carried across
the Indian Ocean and through the Malacca Strait from the
Middle East, Bauxite originating in Australia and Indonesia
transited an eastern Asia route v/hile minerals dominated the
trans-Pacific route from the .^.ericas. -^ By 1977 im.ports had
increased to 592.7 million tons which included over 300
4
million tons of oil.
Food imports climbed from 15.5 million tons in 1972 to
over 28 million tons in 1977. By 1980, 70 percent of the
food consumed in Japan was imported. Japan's commercial
fishing fleet, the largest in the world provided the bulk of
the protein for public consumption. Grain imports alone,
on the other hand, are expected to top 30 million tons by
1985.'^
Japan is almost totally dependent on imports for the
most basic of strategic materials and food. Figure 4-2 dis-
plays this dependence vividly leaving no doubt as to the
importance of reliable ocean comjnerce. Nearly every critical
metal, energy source, and food must be imported by Japan.
In addition, most of Japan's $102 billion of exports in
1979 were carried by shipping that amounted to approximately
g3,400 ship visits per month to Japan. During the Fourth
Arab War, the reduction of only 3 percent of her total oil
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imports served notice of the vulnerability "..,not only to
oil supplies but also to its national defense posture in
ggeneral." The overwhelming statistics have led James Buck
to state that "Japan is the single industrialized nation
most vulnerable to disruption of international trade patterns
and access to food, energy, rav; material sources and markets.
Jay Sorenson concluded,
Japan's Achilles heel is its extreme dependence as a highly
industrialized, island nation on stable markets and depend-
able sources of raw materials. Japan is highly vulnerable
to the kind of economic blackmail that the Arabs exerted
during the 1973 Iliddle East War, and the Japanese are also
very nervous about their shipping lanes.
H
B. JAPANESE RESPONSES
The responses taken by Japan to deal with resource
scarcity and dependence fall into two broad categories
:
national and international actions. National measures in-
volve a restructuring of the nation's economic philosophy
tov/ard a slower growth rate in which emphasis is being shifted
from primary (production) industries to the tertiary (leisure
and recreation) industries v/hile maintaining steady growth
in the secondary (investment) industries. A second tactic
being used is a shift toward labor intensive, lov; energy
industries of the type labeled by the Japanese as "thought
intensive" or high technology industries. Both of these
policies serve the same purpose of promoting the relative
advantage of the nation by m.aximizing use of its indigenous
factors of production v/hile minir.izing the requirements for




other national measures being undertaken by Japan include
the stockpiling of strategic and vital resources as a hedge
against temporary restrictions, price fluctuations or sealane
interdiction. In 1976 legislation was passed to establish,
by 1980, a one-month government stockpile of grains, soybeans
and sugar to supplement the existing private stocks averaging
12
a one-month supply. Private industry, v;ith governmental
support, has been increasing its stockpiles of critical
metals and ores toward a comm.on goal of a one-year supply.
In 1978 the Japan Petroleum Development Corporation began
to maintain a stockpile of 30 m.illion kiloliters (30-day
supply) of oil. In I98O, a plan for an additional 90-day
stockpile for private industry was established to be achieved
in 1981. Private stocks of liquified natural gas (LNG)
amounted to a 10-day supply at the end of I98O. The govern-
ment has proposed legislation to the Diet which would stockpil
a 15-day supply by the end of 198I (460,000 tons) and the
volume would be increased gradually to 3 m.illion tons by
141988, The main drawbacks to stockpiling are the require-
ments for a massive tie-up of capital resources that could
be used m.ore productively elsewhere, and the obvious limits
to the amounts of goods that can be stockpiled in the face
of a total disruption or embargo.
Other useful measures being instituted include strict
conservation measures, the use of alternative products and
substitutes, em.phasis on efficiency of use, and recycling;
21

all of which are geared to minimize the basic import require-
ments. In the energy field, the use of LNG and nuclear power
is being strongly promoted. As of July 1979, there were 19
reactors in operation producing 12.7 million KW. Nine addi-
tional plants were under construction and seven more are
planned v;hich is expected to boost the total production to
28 million KW by 1935. That output is estimated to provide
156,7 percent of the national usage in 1985. Long range
administration goals call for output in 1990 to reach 51 mil-
lion KW but f-lITI estimates go no higher than 43 million KW.
A major effort to combat the rising prices of energy is
being conducted through a system of differential pricing.
Through the pricing mechanism, vital heavy industries, indus-
tries which still maintain a relative advantage, and low
energy using industries are being encouraged to expand and
maintain production levels through lower energy cosrs, tax
credits and loans. Heavy industries that are big energy
users and who are not competitive are being discouraged
against any expansion. The brunt of this pricing differential
is being absorbed by the non-vital (leisure and luxury) in-
dustries and by the private consumers through increased
gasoline prices and utility costs.
On the international level, Japan has established a
policy of maintaining cordial relationships with all countries
and urging international peace and stability. Toward these
ends, she has tried to avoid political controversy by
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downplaying her alliances and her military power and by
refusing to take sides in issues involving her main suppliers.
The Japanese government has taken an active role in en-
couraging and directing the nature of her foreign trade.
The oil shocks of 1973 and 1978 have been described by econ-
omists as the most significant events in Japan since World
War II. Japan was importing 70 percent of her oil from Iran
17
when the change in government necessitated finding new sources.
This event emphasized the requirement for Japan to diversify
her sources to the extent as to not be dependent on any one
country so that she will be buffered from any local disrup-
tion in supply o Saudi Arabia is now Japan's largest supplier
with a 30 percent share while imports from Kuwait, UAE, Oman,
Qatar, Malaysia, and Brunei have increased between 14 percent
and 68 percent. Significantly, spot purchases clim.bed by
1 R
68 percent o In addition, significant progress has been
made in increasing trade and oil development ventures with
China and Mexico.
In structuring foreign trade, Japan, in her quest to
diversify sources, has also attempted to make herself the
most important customer of the individual suppliers. Ideally,
four to five countries would each provide 20-25 percent of
the total import requirements for a particular commodity.
This would allow sufficient flexibility in the event that
one of the sources is cut off. By the same measure of limit-
ing the number of sources to four or five, an attempt is
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made to have each supplier provide 50 percent or more of its
exports to Japan, therefore, making it highly advantageous
to the supplier to maintain uninterrupted commerce. As a
side benefit, Japan is in a position to obtain better terms
of trade by encouraging competition among the major suppliers.
Supplementing this strategy is one of creating good terms of
trade for Japanese consumer goods in the nations that are the
major resource suppliers o By providing fair terms, Japan
hopes to encourage interdependence and a growing demand for
her products and therefore, a growing demand for foreign
exchange,
Japan has also begun to reduce trade barriers to encourage
the flow of goods and long term contracts have been sought
in order to stabilize both the supply and price levels of
raw materials.
Overseas development assistance and private investment
in overseas projects have gone hand in hand with the program
to diversify resource suppliers. Official Development Aid
CODA) reached $2.2 billion in 1973, a 55 percent increase
from 1977, v/hile bilateral government loans increased by 73
percent. Asian nations accounted for 60.6 percent of the
official development assistance followed by Africa, the Mid-
east and Latin America with 18.6 percent, 10.4 percent and
198.6 percent, respectively. ^ Private investment overseas
advanced by 77 percent over the same period o By area, Latin
America headed the list with 37. ^ percent ($2.14 billion)
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mainly on the strength of oil development projects in Mexico.
Asia xvas second with 28.7 percent sparked by an Indonesian
20
aluminum project. It should be emphasized however, that
even though Japan's assistance programs have shown large
growth in recent years, the great majority of that growth
has come in the form of direct investment and government loans
as opposed to outright grants,
A final tool Japan has been using to protect its economy
from resource scarcity has been manipulation of the foreign
exchange market. By allowing the yen to appreciate in the
world market, she has been able to somewhat damper domestic
inflation and more importantly, to reduce the cost of imported
raw materials and energy. The cost has been a slowing of




TABI£ 4-1: PERCEM' OF TOTAL E'tPORTS OF SELECTED MTERIiil^











routes 13.1 25.9 20.0 12.4 96.3
Northern Indian
Ocean and thru




Malacca St. 1.7 8.8 0.4
Trans-Pacific from
North and South
America 0.3 32.4 19.8 3^.1 33.6 2.3
*Data are for 1970.
Source: World Energy Supplies, 196I-7O, bTJ Statistical Papers.
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TABIE 4-2: PERCENT OF STRATEGIC MATERIAL CONSUMPTION
IMPORTED (NET), 1975
Aluminum (ore and metal) 100 Manganese - 88
Chromium — 98 Nickel - 100
Cobalt - 98 Phosphates - 100
Copper - 90 Rubber - 100
Energy - 90* Tin - 97
Food — 70* Tungsten - 100
Iron (ore and metal) - 99 Zinc - 55
Lead — 73
* Indicates 198O data based on Far Eastern Economic Review
1980 Yearbook.
Source: International Economic Report of the President trans-
mitted to Congress January 1977, (Washington: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1977)
TABLE U-3: INTERNATIONAL SEA-BORNE TRAFFIC ENTERING JAPAN






























V. THREATS TO SEA-LANE SECURITY
When defense of the sea-lanes is contemplated by the
military planners of a nation, one of the first questions
that must be resolved is the capability of a potential enemy
to effectively interdict those sea-lanes. Military hardware,
logistics and geographic considerations must all be taken into
account. A second aspect that must be considered hand-in-
hand with military capability is the objectives of T:he poten-
tial enemy. In other words, is it in the best interests of
the potential enemy to use all or a portion of his capability
to disrupt sea communications or are other means available
to accomplish the same goals? Once the planners have satis-
factorily, in their own minds, evaluated the magnitude and
probability of the threat, they must then weigh the options
and tactics available to them to most effectively counter
the threat and insure secure sea communications.
A. PERSPECTIVES ON SEA-LANE INTERDICTION
The primary areas of threat to Japanese sea-lanes are:
Cl) at the source of raw materials; (2) in the vital Malacca,
Lombok, and Sunda Straits; and (3) along the approaches to
Japan's industrial centers. The disruption of oil shipments
during the 1973 Middle East crisis shocked Japan into action
to protect her sources of raw materials and oil in particular.
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Since that time she has engaged in an ambitious and quite
successful project to diversify her resource suppliers.
Through programs of economic development and technological
aid she has widely expanded her trade relations with South
America and Mexico, Southeast Asia, and Canada in addition
to joint development projects in China.
The Japanese have neither the ability nor the desire to
militarily guard the sea-lanes in the vicinity of the xMalacca
Strait. This position is widely acknowledged by both civilian
and military spokesmen. The Japanese strive to maintain
close diplomatic and economic relations with the nations
controlling the straits. The Japanese also acknowledge that
the Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) alone cannot provide
for convoy defense and antisubmarine warfare responsibility
in the local sea area without the support of U.S. forces.
In this "local sea area", which the MSDF defines as coastal
waters within approximately 300 miles of Japan and out to
1,000 miles along the two major sea-lanes, through the Bonin
Islands on the east and tov/ard Taiwan on the v;est, the
Japanese Defense Agency even expresses doubts regarding the
U.S. Navy's ability to protect shipping. In the 1979 Defense
White Paper it states:
Regarding the capability of the U.S. Seventh Fleet to
maintain control of sea-lanes, while the Seventh Fleet
has substantial capability for antisubmarine warfare for
its own defense, judging from force quantity it does not
have sufficient capability to protect merchant shipping
in the Indian Ocean and western Pacific, and therefore
will have difficulty in completely preventing the Soviet




Western analysts of the Soviet Navy generally agree that
"interdiction of enemy sea-lanes" falls far do\^m the scale
of wartime mission priorities for the Soviet Navy. The stra-
tegic nuclear strike mission, which includes forces assigned
to insure the survivability of the SSBN fleet, is clearly
the number one priority. Destruction of enemy naval forces,
encompassing antisubmarine actions against U.S. SSBNs and
anticarrier measures, occupies a second but still vital mis-
sion. A study of Gorshkov's writing seems to bear out the
relative position of the interdiction mission." In 196? he
listed the disruption of the ocean lines of communications
as one of the most important of the Fleet's missions. In
more recent publications, interdiction has not even been
listed among current naval missions. In The Sea Power of
the State he indicates that because of the impact of nuclear
weapons on naval tactics, strikes against ports and sources
of supply would be much more effective than at-sea interdiction
A second line of thought centers on the well-documented
Soviet emphasis on the need for a balanced navy which was
described by Gorshkov in Morskoy Sbcrnik in 1967,
By a well-balanced navy we mean a navy which in composition
and armament is capable of carrying out missions assigned
it not only in a nuclear war, but in a war which does not
make use of nuclear weapons, and is also able to support
state interests at sea in peacetime.
3
With this emphasis on the ability of a navy to function in
a conventional war, as compared to a shorter duration nuclear
exchange, the antisea-lanes of communication (SLOG) role
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becomes much more relevant. Donald Daniel cites a 1976
article in Morskoy Sbornik which indicates increased empha-
sis on the anti-SLOC mission. In addition, an analysis of
OKEAN 75 also suggested increased Soviet emphasis on SLOC
5interdiction.
Regardless of the priority assignment within the Soviet
Navy to the interdiction mission, the growing size of the
Soviet fleet, particularly in attack submarines, will relieve
the Soviets of having to make an either/or decision. Their
choice will not be "Can we conduct an interdiction campaign?"
but rather "What amount of resources can we devote to
interdiction?"
The assignment of even a few assets to an interdiction
role may even provide added benefits from the Soviet point
of view by tying down a significant number of Western ASW
forces. This would support the primary Soviet mission area
by preserving the security of the SSBM as a strategic reserve.
Nitze estimates that the Soviets could assign no more than
20 Pacific-based submarines to an anti-SLOC role and as such
evaluates the threat to the Pacific and Indian Ocean SLOCs as
"significant but manageable." However, in a more geographi-
cally limited conflict, in which those 20 submarines were




B. SOVIET PACIFIC FLEET
The Soviet Pacific Fleet began a significant buildup
program in i960 which has continued unabated to the present.
Table 5-1 examines the current Order of 3attle.
The primary threat to Japanese shipping will come from
submarines and land-based strike aircraft. During the early
stages of a major conflict, the bulk of these forces will be
occupied in countering U.S. submarines and carrier task forces.
As the conflict protracts, the role for sea-lane interdiction
would become ever more important.
Soviet surface units are probably not intended for an
anti-SLOC role. If the Soviets withhold a significant number
of their SSBN assets from the early stages of a conflict as
expected, the surface fleet's primary mission will be to main-
tain safe operating sanctuaries free from U.S. attack submarines
and ASW task groups. This rationale notwithstanding, should
the surface forces be assigned a role of interdiction, their
firepower of 363 surface-to-surface missile launchers and
214 large caliber guns, has the capability of significantly
7disrupting the flow of material to Japan.
Air assets which could be used in the anti-SLOC role are
centered around the 110 Badger and Blinder aircraft in the
Pacific Fleet. It should also be realized that within the
Soviet philosophy of a frontal strategy, additional aircraft
of the Long Range Air Force (including 10 Backfire bombers)
could be made available to augment naval units. The primary
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:ABI£ 3~1: SC^/IET PACIFIC FIZET COB (^3 OF JUNE 1980)
Submarines (110) Surface Vessels ( cont .
)
Ballistic missile Delta SSBN 10 Amphibious Ivan Rogov LPD 1
submarine (30) Yankee S.SBN 11 vessels (57)
Hotel SSBN 3 Ropucha L2T 10
Golf SSB 6 Alligator I^T




submarine (23) Echo II SSGN Other Ir^nrilng
-r>j
Juliet SSG ^ Patrol boats Nanuchka PG-G
Whisky SSG (166) Osa PTG
Other missile 55
Attack submarines Echo I SSN boats
(57) November SSN 13
Victor SSN Poti PCE 111
^//hisky SS
Foxtrot SS 44 Mine Warfare
Other patrol
boats
Zulu/Bravo SS Vessels (95) Natya MSF
T-58 MSF
T-43 MSF 50
Surface vessels (397) Yurka MSF
ASW Acft Carrier(l) Kiev CVSG 1 Other mine
45
warfare eft









































Utility aircraft Various 60
Source: Far Eastern Economic Re^/iew, Asia 1981 Yearbook
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armament of Soviet strike aircraft are air-to-surface missiles
capable of conventional or nuclear warheads. The unrefueled
combat radius of Soviet aircraft would permit them to strike
as far away as the Malacca Straits from bases within the
Soviet homeland.
Soviet diesel-powered attack submarines are extremely
quiet while submerged and are ideally suited for the anti-
SLOC role in offshore waters. Their lack of speed can be
nullified by operating closer to vital harbors and straits.
Nuclear-powered attack submarines, also possessing torpedos
as their main armament, are not as quiet as the diesel sub-
marines and therefore are more susceptible to passive means
of detection. Their superior speed however, allows them to
operate in a much larger ocean area while maintaining the
same capability for sea-lane interdiction. The 23 cruise
missile submarines available to the Pacific Fleet are proba-
bly intended to be used in an anticarrier role. Although
they would be an extremely capable platform in the anti-SLOC
role, they are clearly more valuable and most cost effective
in fulfilling their primary mission. The cruise missiles
carried by these submarines are also available in both con-
ventional and nuclear configurations.
C. SOVIET OPTIONS
The military strength of the Soviet Union allows her a
great many options for accomplishing the defeat of Japan.
IQM

Limiting factors are the scope of the overall conflict and
the Soviet view of Japan's ultimate role in the post-conflict
world
.
The interdiction of raw materials at their source has
been stated as a preferred tactic in overall Soviet Strategy.
The invasion of Afghanistan and Soviet activities in Yemen,
Somolia, Ethiopia, and other Middle East countries have lent
credence to this point of view. This tactic however, can
only be used as part of a broad, long-range plan. The lack
of selectivity in implementing the plan militarily, would
preclude the isolation of a single target country such as
Japan. Implementation would necessarily affect the vital
national interests of a large number of nations who are de-
pendent on the Middle East for their energy supplies.
An attempt to interdict Japanese sea-lanes by cutting
the Malacca, Sunda and Lombok Straits would likewise pose a
severe problem with identification and selectivity. Addition-
al problems involved in rearming and resupplying the participating
units, along with the extended flight times for strike air-
craft, make this option one of the least desirable from the
Soviet point of view. Albert Axelbank, when discussing the
defense of the Malacca Strait, said that in a wartime situation
"...the danger to Japan's industrial sinews would be of much
o
closer proximity than the Malacca Strait."
The interdiction of merchant shipping to Japan on the
high seas could be accomplished using any number of combinations
1Q5

of strike aircraft, submarines and surface forces. The
Japanese do not have sufficient indigenous forces to prevent
or to break this type of naval blockade. Although identifi-
cation and targeting problems are greatly compounded by
operating on the high seas, as opposed to a blockade in the
coastal waters and harbors of Japan, the Soviet sea surveil-
lance system could provide sufficient data for a successful
campaign. Providing a low level of conflict could be main-
tained, an added benefit could be realized through the
deterrent value of an announced blockade. A "quarantine
effect", under the threat of being sunk, could have a sig-
nificant impact on neutral flag shipping. The major drav/back
to this option is that it invites escalation, leading to war
with the United States. While the U.S. is not obligated to
protect Japanese shipping on the high seas, interdiction of
the sea-lanes is clearly a serious threat to the Japanese
economy and as such is highly prejudicial to U.S. security
interests. The United States would almost certainly respond
militarily to the interdiction of Japanese sea-planes.
A much more efficient solution to the interdiction of
Japanese shipping would be the destruction of the harbor
facilities and cargo handling equipment. Soviet strike air-
craft could accomplish this mission quickly and effectively.
However, this action would undoubtedly lead to a miilitary
response by the United States under the Mutual Security
Treaty of i960. Article Five of that document obligates the
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U.S. to "meet the common danger in accordance with its con-
stitutional provisions and processes" in the event of an
armed attack on Japanese territory. An Agreed Minute of
Che Treaty calls for immediate consultations with Japan in
case of an attack and states that the U.S. "intends to take
the necessary measures for the defense of these islands..."
Should the destruction of Japanese harbor and port facili-
ties be contemplated as part of a larger war effort, the
fastest and most efficient method of eliminating Japan as
a factor in the war would be a concentrated nuclear strike
against the industrial center between Tokyo and Kobe. As
of 1979, 51.4 percent of the Japanese population were packed
into this 250 m.ile long coastal strip that comprises only
Q
19 percent of Japan's land mass. The concentration of
people and industry into this "Tokaido ?4egalopolis" , a total
lack of civil defense programs and virtually no warning
period in the event of a sea-launched nuclear attack, ensures
the total economic and political destruction of Japan.
While some Japanese have expressed concern that the Soviet
buildup of forces on the Northern Islands poses a threat of
invasion to the Japanese mainland, this course of action is
the least likely and the most costly from the Soviet point
of view. The amphibious lift capability of the Soviet Pacific
Fleet is minimal at best. Even though a successful invasion
could still be staged, it would be tedious and much less
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efficient than other options. Makoto Moraoi is straight forward
in his assessment that
...no aggressor will resort to an open, large-scale armed
attack on Japan so long as other means of coercion are
available ... Rather than launching a frontal assault, an
adversary nation would be tempted to exploit some of Japan's
inherent vulnerabilities .. .heavy reliance on sea-lines of
communication. . .and susceptibility to "quarantine" or
blockade. 10
The only military threat that Japan can realistically mount
against the Soviet Union is the closure of the straits around
Japan thereby prohibiting the free movements of naval units
to and from Vladivostok. In the event of a short-duration,
high-intensity war, this would have little effect on Soviet
strength as it is anticipated that the Soviets would have
sufficient advance warning of the conflict to put their units
to sea before the outbreak of hostility. In a protracted con-
ventional war in which sea-lane interdiction became a factor,
a war of attrition would be waged as Soviet surface and sub-
marine units would be forced to transit minefields, ASW barriers,
and face missile-armed combatants in coastal waters in order
to return to their bases for rearming and resupply.
In the context of this scenario, the rationale behind the
Soviet buildup of forces and facilities on the northern islands
and on Sakhalin Island comes into focus. There are two divi-
sions of Soviet troops on Sakhalin. Troop deployments to
Kunashiri and Etorofu in the southern Kuriles began in May of
1978 and expanded to Shikotan in the summer of 1979. There
are now 6,000 men on the Northern Islands equipped with tanks.
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anti-aircraft missiles, artillery and attack helicopters.
Three airfields have been constructed with runway lengths to
3,000 meters. There are nine naval facilities providing
anchorages and harbors including Hilokappu Bay where the Japa-
nese secretly assembled their fleet prior to departing for
the strike on Pearl Harbor. While the forces on Sakhalin
and the Northern Islands are insufficient to mass a major attack,
in the event of war they would be extremely valuable in seiz-
ing vital positions on the tip of Hokkaido to prevent the
Japanese from closing that strait to Soviet use. Utilizing
ground support aircraft from the Northern Islands bases and
amphibious landing craft currently present on the islands, a
successful landing could be mounted.
D. THIRD WORLD NAVIES
The decade of the 1970s brought a dramatic increase in
the ability of Third V/orld nations to disrupt or interdict
maritime shipping. Spearheading this movement has been the
numerical and qualitative growth of fast patrol boats (PPB)
armed with anti-ship missiles. The af fordability and lethali-
ty of this combination has proven to be very attractive to
smaller countries who until now, have not been able to influ-
ence the operations of the big ship navies.
The anti-ship missiles have several characteristics that
have made them appealing to countries seeking a limited sea
denial capability. First, they are relatively cheap, with
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prices starting at just a few thousand dollars. Even the more
expensive models, at several hundred thousand dollars, are
considerably cheaper than an aircraft or major ship with com-
parable firepower. Second, anti-ship missiles can be adapted
to a wide variety of existing platforms from small patrol craft
to major combatants. Third, anti-ship missiles are fairly
simple to operate and reasonably reliable. Most models require
only a minimum of support equipment and pre-launch preparation.
Fourth, their capability to hit and damage ships is widely
understood and accepted. The emphasis on this point is the
psychological impact and the ability to influence a situation
through the threat of force in a revival of classic gunboat
diplomacy. Finally, suppliers are widespread and numerous.
Ten countries are currently producing anti-ship missiles:
Canada, China, France, Israel, Italy, Norway, Sweden, the
12United Kingdom, the United States, and the USSR. Only Sweden
and China do not appear to be producing for the export market.
In addition to anti-ship missiles, many Third World coun-
tries now possess torpedo firing diesel-electric submarines.
The diesel submarine has excellent range and when used in
shallow coastal waters provides an excellent capability for
sea-lane interdiction. Third World countries have been sup-
plied with submarines through military aid and sales from the
major power navies. In addition. West Germany and the Nether-
lands produce excellent submarines for export.
IIQ

In order for a Third World country to interdict or disrupt
sea communications, they must possess, in addition to a capable
weapons system, a means for surveillance and reconnaissance.
This is a critical item if an interdiction campaign is to be
directed against one specific country. Third World nations
commanding a geographical advantage of a strait, such as Indo-
nesia, can fulfill this need with shore-based radars and small
aircraft and boats, while nations such as the Philippines must
rely heavily on long-range patrol aircraft.
Several scenarios could be developed which would threaten
Japanese sea-lanes. A minor naval power flanking Japanese
shipping routes on the high seas may take an overt hostile
action to enforce its claims to territorial sea limits or to
further its political aims. Two nations involved in a dispute
over control of a vital strait may take action to close the
strait to any country not supporting their claim. Moreover,
nations may bow to Soviet pressure to interrupt or harass
Japanese shipping in order to forward Soviet interests. Such
actions could begin with the harassment of merchant ships,
such as dangerous maneuvering by warships and low-level over-
flights by aircraft. If a claim to territorial seas is in
question, the aggressor nation may resort to the boarding and
searching of merchant vessels which could then escalate to
seizure of the ships and their creiv. The next level may in-
volve the sinking of ships without warning, culminating in a
total campaign of interdiction.
Ill

While unilateral actions such as those described above
would certainly evoke worldwide condemnation and would risk
retaliation by Japan or the United States, the threat is none-
theless real. As James Cable stated.
There are already more navies than there are rational gov-
ernments. Some of these navies may only be intended to
provide rem.unerative and respectable employment for the
officer class, but many could actually be used and some
probably will be, whether or not the results commend them-
selves to reasonable men. 13
The most serious threat posed by Third World navies to
Japanese sea-lanes would come in conjunction with a major
conflict between the NATO powers and the Warsaw Pact nations.
The ability to concentrate effective naval power in a limited
sea area could cut a vital sea route in an area such as the
Malacca Strait or the Arabian Sea. Milan Vego evaluates this
threat
While in peacetime a Soviet client-state might behave with
restraint for fear of Western reprisals, there would be no
such inhibitions in a general conflict, particularly if
the country's leadership perceived the Warsaw Pact as the
winner in the conflict. ^^
In Northeast Asia, China, by far, possesses the greatest
potential for sea-lane interdiction and even though current
political relations seem to be on the upswing, the Japanese
are well aware of the changing nature of international senti-
ments, (See Table 5-2) With 99 submarines and 20 missile-
equipped major combatants, the Chinese could severely disrupt
sea communications in the East China Sea and the South China
Sea. They can project only limited force into the Philippine
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TABLE 5-2: NAVAL CRDER OF BATTLE FOR NATTONS ADJACEI'JT TO JAPANESE SEA-LAI-ES,
indicates surface-to-surface missile equipped.
Country Su'omarine Destroyer Frigate Cor^/ette FP3 Patrol
SS/SSN DD b'bVP^ Craft
NORTHEAST ASIA
China 99 12(12) 17(8) 9 829(181) 621
S. Korea —
.
10 7 6 14(9) 38
N. Korea 16 — 4 — 317(18) 25
Taiwan 2 22(4) 9 3 10(4)
SOUTHEAST A^IA
Indonesia 4 — 7 3(3) 8(4) 30
Singapore — -^ — - 12(6) 38
Malaysia — 2 - 14(8) 30
Philippines — — 2 10 — 55
Brunei — - 3(3) 9
Vietnam — 3 2 44(10) 101
SOUTH ASIA
India 8 3(3) 29(2) 4(4) 16(16) 6
Pakistan 6 6 1 - 16 3
Sri Tflnka — - 6 17
Rringladesh — — 2 - — 4
MIDDLE EAST
Iran — 3C3) 4(4) 4 9(9) 7
UAR — — — - 6 9
Oman — — 3 — 10(2)
N. Yemen — — — - 3 5
S. Yemen — — — - 8(4) 6
Somalia — ,— — - 9(2) 5
Bahrain — — - 4(2) 14
Kuv\m.t — — - — 43
Qatar "^^ —'" *" '~* 6
Source: The Mlitary Balance
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Sea due to the fuel and logistics limitations. Japan could
minimize the effect of unilateral Chinese action against her
sea-lanes by moving the routes further seaward. North Korea,
although much closer to the junction of the Japanese sea-lanes,
would also face a logistics problem. In order to put its
naval units into position to attack, they must transit around
South Korea and the southern tip of Kyushu. It is difficult
to imagine a scenario in which North Korea would take unilat-
eral action against Japan because of superpower interest.
Likewise, it is difficult to envision a scenario for general
war involving the U.S. and USSR, in which the bulk of North
Korean forces would not be dedicated to opposing South Korea.
Taiwan and South Korea, in addition to enjoying political
rapproachment with Japan, have insufficient forces to effec-
tively threaten Pacific sea-lanes although both countries are
engaged in naval acquisition programs which include Harpoon
surface-to-surface missiles.
Indonesian control of the vital Lombok and Sunda Straits
makes her the greatest potential threat in Southeast Asia.
Even though her naval forces number only 4 submarines and 7
missile-capable surface units, the geographic advantage she
holds enhances the capabilities of even the oldest and most
obsolete units. The naval forces of Singapore and Malaysia
are centered around their FPBs, both missile and torpedo
equipped. Both countries have been engaged in procurement
programs for missile-equipped patrol craft and this trend
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should continue. The legal implications raised by the Law
of the Sea Conferences regarding the question of free passage
through the Malacca Strait has the potential for conflict
based on overlapping claims by Malaysia, Indonesia and Singa-
pore. A local conflict could threaten the security of all
transiting vessels regardless of nationality. Vietnam's
naval forces lack the range and seaward mobility to seriously
threaten Japanese shipping. Brunei and the Philippines do
not possess forces capable of at-sea operations.
India's military power is vastly superior to any other
South Asian country. With an aircraft carrier, 3 submarines,
3 new missile frigates, 4 missile corvettes and l6 fast attack
missile boats, she can not only disrupt ocean trade on nearby
sea routes but also has the capability to project her power
into the Arabian Sea. India is also adding to her forces
with the procurement of 7 new submarines and four additional
15
corvettes. When improvements to the base at Port Blair in
the Andaman Islands are completed, India v;ill be in a geo-
graphic position to control the sea lanes through the Malacca
1 6
Strait. The other South Asian and Middle East nations
adjacent to major sea-lanes can only exert influence on those
sea-lanes passing within their coastal waters. Their navies
are generally made up of fast attack craft and patrol boats.
Missile-equipped boats are being purchased on a widespread
basis primarily from France and West Germany. While force
levels remain low, the rapid proliferation of surface-to-surface
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missiles and the political volatility of the area will great-
ly increase the future threat to Japanese shipping.
E. JAPANESE PERCEPTIONS OF THE THREAT
Japan has long snuggled into the security blanket of the
U.S. -Japan Mutual Cooperation and Security Treaty of I960,
Beginning with the announcement of the Nixon Doctrine in
July, 1969, which stated an American expectation that Asian
nations take a larger responsibility for their own security,
the Japanese have perceived that the blanket is being slowly
unraveled. The demobilization of U.S. ground and naval forces
following the withdrawal from Vietnam emphasized the Nixon
Doctrine in terms of capability rather than just intentions.
The 1973 oil crisis awakened the Japanese public to the vul-
nerability of their sea-lanes of communications and the total
dependence of the Japanese economy on imported resources.
The announcement of a plan to withdraw U.S. troops from South
Korea drew widespread attention. As a reaction to the crisis
in Iran, the U.S. changed its policy of maintaining a carrier
task group in the North Pacific resulting in extensive cov-
erage in the Japanese press. These factors contributed to a
conviction of the Japanese public revealed by a recent Asahi
Shimbun poll which indicated that only 22 percent believed
17
that in an emergency, America would defend Japan in earnest.
The buildup of Soviet forces in the Pacific began in




vessels, 110 submarines and 382 aircraft. Included in these
totals are ballistic missile submarines, a Kiev class aircraft
carrier and the largest amphibious ship in the Soviet inven-
tory. During OKEAN II in 1975, Soviet maneuvers in the Pacific
included four squadrons deployed in the Sea of Okhotsk, in
the Marianas Islands, in the vicinity of the Caroline Islands
and in the East China Sea. Osamu Miyoshi postulated that
...the main military goals of the Soviet Fleet, in the
event of a total Soviet and American war are: first to
attack and demolish U.S. bases on the West Coast and in
the Western Pacific Ocean; second, to cut off Japan from
U.S. military operation in the Western Pacific; and third,,
„
to intercept or disrupt Japan's main oceanic trade routes.
The buildup of Soviet military strength on the Xurile Islands
which began in 1978 is an extremely sensitive issue to the
Japanese. Likewise, Japan's reaction to the Soviet invasion
of Afghanistan was very strong including economic sanctions,
the suspension of Siberian development talks, and support of
the Olympic boycott. Forty-tv/o percent of the respondents
in a 1981 poll indicated that they felt anxiety about other
countries attacking Japan and of that group, 79 percent most
20feared the Soviet Union. In March of I98O, six Soviet naval
vessels and an icebreaker transited the Soya Strait and across
the frozen Sea of Okhotsk. As the first demonstration of its
kind near Japanese waters, it attracted a great deal of pub-
21lie attention. Extensive media coverage is also devoted
to other Soviet warship transits of Japanese straits, recon-
naissance flights near Japan and the ever more frequent missile
firing exercises in the Sea of Okhotsk.
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The Japanese are acutely aware of their total vulnera-
bility to nuclear attack. The concentration of population
and industry in the Tokyo-Osaka metropolitan areas, the
absence of any anti-ballistic missile system, minim.al conven-
tional air defense capability and no civil defense program,
all aggravate the effects of a nuclear strike.
Regarding the Japanese defense capability against an all-
out conventional assault, the outlook is only slightly better.
Without U.S. assistance, Osamu Kaihara estimated that
In the event the Soviet Union were to attack Japan tomor-
row, Japan's air-defense system, in my judgement, would be
wiped out in about 10 minutes, Japan's maritime fighting
force would not last m.ore than two or three days and Japan's
ground force capabilities v/ould come to an end in three or
four days. 22
While granting that Kaihara represents one of the more pessi-
mistic points of view, the attitude is widespread that Japan
could not withstand an assault by the Soviet Union. In
short, a large-scale invasion or a nuclear attack would most
likely result in the destruction of Japan's only real assets,
her people and her industrial complex.
With this in mind, James Merely assesses the most probable
threat by commenting
The most likely potential military threat to Japan and
its lifesupport systems would therefore seem to be the
cutting off of supplies by the interdiction of its air
and sea-lanes. Less likely, because it would probably
be unnecessary, is a bombing attack or an invasion by
ground assault forces. 23
The Japanese are very aware of the threats to their
sea-lanes of communication. Recent indications of direct
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threats to the sea routes include the introduction of Backfire
bombers to the Kamchatka peninsula as part of the Long Range
Air Force and evidence that the port at Najin, in the extreme
northeast of North Korea is being developed as a potential
24Soviet warm-water base. The Soviet use of Vietnamese facil-
ities at Cam Ranh Bay and Danang as resupply and staging areas
has also been of concern to the Japanese. The Japanese Defense
Agency expressed concern that the USSR intends to
...use airfields, ports and harbors in Indochina on a
permanent basis. This would have an impact on the mili-
tary balance between the U.S. and the USSR. This would
not only affect the peace and security of this region,
and the security of sea lines of communication, but also
impose restrictions on activities by Western nations in
areas surrounding this region. ^5
Regarding the potential threat from Third World nations,
Japan has taken no overt military action to insure the securi-
ty of her sea-lanes and has, in fact, adopted an attitude of
benevolent neglect. Japan has been careful in her diplomatic
dealings with the Third World to emphasize her lack of mili-
tary capability and her disdain for the use of force in
solving international disputes. Her efforts to insure sea-
lane security have been completely restricted to economic
and political actions. Using only the criteria of available
naval power, the Japanese approach is logically sound. The
Japanese navy does not have the logistic capability to sus-
tain operations far from the homeland, a limitation highlighted
by their own proclamation limiting their area of concern to
1000 MM along the major sea routes. Additionally, even if
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Japanese units were in a geographic position to oppose Third
World interdiction activities, their general lack of tactical
air power, anti-air (anti-missile) warfare capability and
surface-to-surface missiles would minimize their effective-
ness against missile armed FPBs.
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VI. SEA-LANE DEFENSE: A RATIONAL CHOICE ?
A. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The historical record speaks out strongly in favor of
the use of convoys to protect merchant shipping against
hostile attack. Merchant convoys saved the Allies' Atlantic
lifeline in 1917 and again in 19^2. In each instance indepen-
dent sailing was attempted, leading only to unacceptable losses.
With the implementation of convoy tactics, merchant losses
declined significantly while submarine losses increased.
Between February 1917 and October 1918, British ships
on the high seas suffered a 5.9 percent loss rate while sail-
ing independently as compared to losses of 0.3 percent while
in convoy. In the last eighteen months of World War I, only
257 of 84,000 merchant ships sailing in convoy were sunk and
of these, only two were lost when escorted by both ships and
aircraft
.
In September 1939, Germany possessed 57 U-boats. 3y the
end of November those submarines had sunk 3 9 Allied merchant
ships totaling 3^0,275 tons. The United States declined to
use convoys early in the war. In the first four months of
19^2, 1.2 million tons of shipping were sunk in American
waters. Throughout 19^2, German forces were sinking an aver-
age of 700,000 tons per month, a rate which Germany considered
sufficient to win the war.-^ The exchange rate of merchant
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ships sunk to U-boats sunk was 12.8:1. In 19^3, as the Allies
began to emphasize convoy shipping, the exchange rate dropped
to 2.6:1 and over the final twelve months of the war it dropped
further, to 0.6:1.
Convoy escorts accounted for 67 percent of the total
German submarine losses with land-based aircraft and escort
5
ships proving equally effective in numbers of kills. The
loss rate for Allied shipping through the entire war for ships
sailing in convoys was 0.7 percent. The loss rate for inde-
pendent shipping was at least twice as high.
B. MODERN STUDIES
Technological changes have eroded many of the benefits
of the World War II convoy and at the same time have signifi-
cantly changed many other factors in the equation for sea-lane
security. Submerged endurance of modern submarines, both
nuclear and diesel, coupled with increased speed greatly
enhances their capabilities for sea-lane interdiction. On
the other hand, significant developments in the fields of
acoustic detection and sonar technology have, to som.e extent,
offset submarine developments. Anti-ship cruise missiles,
both air-launched and surface-launched, have added another
dimension to the convoy defense problem just as the shipboard
ASW helicopter has complicated life for the submariners.
The speeds attainable by several classes of today's merchant
ships also offer some degree of protection simply by reducing
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exposure time to the potential threat. With merchants tran-
siting at double the speed of their World War II counterparts,
they force even the most modern submarines to run at high
speeds which limits their detection capability and at the
same time makes them more vulnerable to counterdetection be-
cause of their high generated noise levels.
In 1974, Project Sea Express was conducted in an attempt
to verify these developments and to consider various shipping
alternatives and ASW force configurations for merchant ship
protection. One phase of the study examined the feasibility
of creating a free shipping zone using ASW barriers and area
search techniques which would allow merchants to transit
independently in relative safety within the zone. Another
alternative relied on the use of convoys with dedicated ASW
escorts accompanying the transiting ships. The study concluded
that no independent shipping method was as effective as con-
voying. Additionally, convoying with ASW escort units was
not only more effective in protecting merchant shipping, but
was also more effective than any area search method for de-
7stroymg submarines.
Once the basic theory of convoy shipping has been accepted,
one is faced with the decision of how many convoys will be
formed and of what size. During World War II, convoys averaged
45 ships departing U.S. ports daily. More modern planners
think in terms of 60 ships sailing twice a week. It is esti-
mated that due to the increased size (15,000 tons as compared
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to 5,000 tons) and speed (15 knots as compared to 10 knots)
of modern merchants, an equivalent amount of material could
o
be delivered. Another alternative is pulsed shipping which
involves infrequent steaming of very large convoys.
Both plans have advantages and drawbacks that cannot be
overlooked. Small convoys sailing continuously will provide
a continuous supply of targets for enemy attack. In the early
stages of the conflict, before the enemy forces feel the affects
of attrition, loss-es should be expected to be very heavy. On
the other hand, assembly of the required ships, loading, ware-
house capacity and command and control would be much easier
in a small convoy. In addition, the most significant advan-
tage in using small convoys is the time factor involved.
Smaller amounts of critical materials delivered early on in
the conflict could well have a greater impact on the outcome
than massive amounts of material delivered too late.
A study of the pulsed shipping method showed that losses,
in the long run, could be reduced by as much as 50 percent.
There is however, a threshold convoy size below which pulsed
Q
shipping offers no particular advantage. The threshold
pulse size ranges from 300 to 500 ships depending on the ex-
pected threat. As the size increases above the threshold,
the effectiveness of pulsed shipping rapidly increases.
Pulsed shipping theory calls for action to occur in two dis-
tinct phases. In the initial phase, material and ships are
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assembled in safe locations while ASW forces carry out exten-
sive area search campaigns against enemy submarines. This
period could last 60 to 120 days depending on the strategic
reserves and stockpiles in the recipient areas. The second
phase consists of the loading, transit, and unloading of the
cargo at its final destination. Both phases of pulsed ship-
ping are designed to minimize the opportunities of exposure
of the ships to enemy forces. The initial delay in shipping
will minimize contact between the merchant ships and submar-
ines, while at the same time provide an opportunity for friendly
ASW forces to seek out and destroy at least some of the enemy
submarines. Sailing the merchant ships in mass is designed
to saturate the offensive capability of the submarines, there-
by reducing the average exposure time for an individual ship.
While pulsed shipping appears attractive in respect to
expected loss rates, there are several drawbacks. The time
required to assemble a convoy of this magnitude may simply
not be available due to limited stockpiles or pressing combat
action by the enemy. Secondly, port dimensions and cargo
handling capacity will not allow the simultaneous processing
of 500 ships on either end of the convoy route. This would
require loading ships in several ports and a transit to an
at-sea rendezvous with the procedure being reversed at the
destination, making ships vulnerable to attack at either end
of the operation. A third drawback is the logistics night-
mare in trying to coordinate port congestion, loading and
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delivery, warehouse capacity, ship availability and command
and control for an operation of this size.
Although the studies mentioned above were concerned with
an Atlantic scenario and the resupply of NATO, the basic con-
cepts retain some measure of validity when applied in the case
of Japan. For example, her excellent port facilities, large
merchant marine, and the stockpiling of strategic resources
all serve to minimize some of the limitations inherent in the
pulsed shipping plan.
It is interesting to note that none of the studies eval-
uated the effects of a tactical nuclear strike on a convoy
formation. A 500 ship convoy, with its vast quantities of
strategic material, would be an inviting target and it would
not be far-fetched to consider the shipment as a critical
factor in the outcome of a conflict thereby making it impera-
tive that the entire convoy be destroyed. With these factors
in mind, we will now look at some of the specific proposals
for defending Japanese sea-lanes.
C. SEKINO PLAN"^-^
The most outspoken advocate of sea-lane control and the
convoy escort concept is Hideo Sekino. He admits that while
protection of maritime traffic will be difficult, the task
is not impossible. Sekino sees the Soviet submarine fleet
as the most probable and most capable threat. Sekino also
feels that a stable balance of nuclear deterrence exists
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between the Soviet Union and the United States. In this con-
text, mutual deterrence and Japan's relationship with the
United States under the Mutual Security Treaty negates the
threat of a Soviet nuclear strike.
The first task in ''The Sekino Vision", as it is labeled
by James Auer, is to reduce shipping to about half of the
normal peacetime levels and to limit the operating areas
for the Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) to the seas north
of Indonesia, between Australia and Japan, and between the
United States and Japan. These shipping lanes conform close-
ly to those described in Chapter '4 (Table 4-1) as providing
the bulk of Japan's strategic minerals. With the majority
of her food imports continuing to be supplied by the United
States, Japan would have to rely on the cooperation of the
U.S., Australia and Indonesia to provide a sufficient amount
of petroleum and coal to ensure her economic survival. Sekino
estimates that 600 ship arrivals per month would ensure Japan's
survival and that 96 destroyer-type ships will be required to
provide adequate ASW defense.
At the same time, the four main straits in the Sea of Japan
would be rained and patroled thereby imposing a blockade be-
tween Soviet submarine bases and their access to the Pacific.
The Tsugaru and Shimonoseki Straits (Figure 6-1) are totally
within Japan's territorial waters and could easily be controlled
with mines and coastal patrols. The Tsugaru Strait, separating
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Ocean. It is the northernmost strait through the Japanese
islands which remains passable in winter. It is 38 miles
long and narrows to 10.5 miles. It is shallow enough to
permit bottom and moored mining; however, currents up to
seven knots would complicate the mining problem. The
Shimonoseki Strait, between Honshu and Kyushu, is very narrow
and has treacherous currents. Submarine traffic from the
Sea of Japan transiting the strait would then have to navi-
gate the shallow and congested inland sea making its use
highly undesirable for all but local traffic. The Tsushima
Strait separates Kyushu from the southern coast of Korea.
About 110 miles separate the two coasts but the channel is
divided by the Japanese islands of Tsushima and Iki Shima.
Both western and eastern channels provide 25 miles of water
suitable for deep-draft vessels. Given the cooperation of
the United States and South Korea, this strait could be
controlled using mines and coastal patrols. Control of the
Soya (.LaPerouse) Strait between Hokkaido and Sakhalin would
be extrem.ely difficult if not impossible because of Soviet
forces on the southern tip of Sakhalin. The strait, which
is frozen in winter, is 23 miles wide and has a limiting
depth of 90 feet. The Tartar Strait, the fifth exit from the
Sea of Japan lies entirely within Soviet water, is shallow
and icebound much of the year, and is not considered significant.
The second phase of Sekino's plan would establish what
Sekino calls a "Maritime Safety Zone'' which would encompass
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the ocean area between two island, chains extending southeast
and southwest from Japan (Figure 6-2). The western chain
follows a line from Kyushu down the Ryukyus to Okinawa to
Taiwan, and the Philippines, ending in Borneo. The eastern
chain extends from Tokyo Bay through the Izu Islands, the
Nanpo Islands and the Bonin Islands, on to Iwo Jima and
terminating in the Marianas. On some of the Japanese islands
in the chains, fixed sonar stations would be established in
addition to bases for ASW patrol planes and helicopters.
All shipping would be routed through the zone in the form of
convoys which could be escorted as required. Throughout the
zone, ASW aircraft and surface units, acting on fixed sonar
detections, would prosecute any submarines that managed to
escape from the Sea of Japan. Patrol planes equipped with
air-to-surface missiles would provide convoy protection against
Soviet surface ships. To provide air defense in the zone,
long-range air search radar and V/STOL (Vertical/Short Take-
off and Landing) fighter aircraft would be stationed on some
of the larger islands in the chains. The Sekino plan is
based on the principle of attrition. Assuming that a portion
of the Soviet threat will be destroyed during each barrier
passage to rearm and refuel, and assuming that the ASW forces
will not suffer unacceptable losses themselves, then the longer
the campaign continues, the more submarines will be lost and
the more cargo will be delivered. Thus the longer the econo-
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Not all strategists agree that the Sekino plan is a via-
ble method for the protection of the sea-lanes of communication.
Harry Rosen says it will work only if stockpiles are built
up, the straits of the Sea of Japan are mined, convoys are
routed far to sea to maximize the time/distance problems for
attacking submarines and that full use is made of U.S. forces
as well as the MSDF.^^
Undoubtedly the most vehement criticism of "The Sekino
Vision" comes from Osamu Kaihara. According to Kaihara, such
a role for the MSD? is "unauthorized, unrealistic, and impos-
14
sible." The role is unauthorized because it is in violation
of the defined types of aggression spelled out in the White
Papers. It is unrealistic because ASW resources, sensors
and platforms, are lacking in both quantity and quality.
Kaihara stresses the very real problems involved in the detec-
tion and destruction of nuclear submarines even with the most
advanced sonar and weapons systems. He also questions that
600 ship arrivals per month could be sustained even if the
large number of escort ships required by the plan were avail-
able. Further, he believes that while ASW patrol aircraft
would be indispensable in peacetime, their bases would be
among the first targets during war thereby severely reducing
the security of the "Maritime Safety Zone." ^ Finally,
Kaihara says the plan is impossible because the mining of
the straits of the Sea of Japan will be construed as an
offensive action by the Soviet Union and will lead to retali-
ation and full-scale war.
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There are two other significant weaknesses in Sekino '
s
plan. To date, the V/STOL fighter has not demonstrated
sufficient range or reliability characteristics to provide
adequate protection in the "Maritime Safety Zone." While
range problems could be alleviated to some extent by routing
convoys closer to the island chains, maintenance and logistics
problems detract from the plan's viability. (It should be
noted that Okinawa and Iwo Jima are the only Japanese islands
in either chain which are large enough to accomodate conven-
tional fighter aircraft.) Another option, although as yet
undeveloped, would be the introduction of an aircraft carrier
for V/STOL aircraft.
Although Sekino relies heavily on the mining of the Sea
of Japan straits as a measure to deny Soviet submarines access
to the sea, he has failed to consider the possibility of the
Soviet use of mines to close Japanese ports and harbors. The
Russians first used mines in the Crimean V/ar and have contin-
ued to place emphasis on mine v/arfare as evidenced by their
huge stockpile of mines and the largest fleet of minesweepers
in the world. Even though the Japanese minesweeping force
is the world's second largest, it is doubtful that the lessons
of "Operation Starvation," would be overlooked by the Soviets.
D. SHILLING PLAN"^'^
David Shilling, a U.S. defense analyst, has proposed an
updated version of the Sekino plan in which he modernizes
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some of the operational concepts and perhaps more signifi-
cantly, quantifies the import reductions required to success-
fully execute the plan. He estimates (based on 1973 data)
that 1978 peacetime import tonnage could reach 800 million
metric tons and ship arrivals would average about 2,150 per
month. The actual import tonnage for 1977 came to 592.7
1 8
million metric tons; however, monthly ship visits were at
3,350 per month (Table 4-3). Although these figures detract
from the statistical balance of his plan, the theoretical
concepts remain valid. Shilling contends that imports could
be reduced by 70 percent through a combination of postponing
non-government investment and the suspension of production
for export. This plan for "austere import requirements"
would involve two key preconditions: sufficient foreign
exchange reserves and/or prearranged credit agreements to
allow continued purchase of critical imports, and the gov-
ernment's willingness to financially support workers displaced
by the elimination of export production.
The second step in achieving this plan aims at reducing
personal consumption through rationing, taxes and price
controls. This, Shilling estimates, could reduce imports
by an additional 35 percent. As a final measure, he recommends
stockpiling of viral raw materials, specifically petroleum.
Assuming an austere consumption rate due to the other measures
described above, the 90-day stockpile of oil currently pro-
grammed, could be stretched to perhaps six months. Food
I3H

imports are not considered a problem because even though 70
percent of Japan's food is imported, it represents only about
5 percent by weight of the total imports.
Shilling summarizes that through this combination of
economic measures and the shift to an austere level of imports,
requirements could be reduced by 85 percent for five to six
months, representing a reduction in shipping requirements
to about 230 ship arrivals per month.
Militarily, Shilling would concentrate MSDP assets in
the sea-lane closest to Japan for convoy escort duties. In
order to maximize the use of the least vulnerable sea-lanes,
priority would be placed on obtaining vital imports from
Indonesia, Australia, Malaysia and the Philippines. Convoys
would then be assembled in a central location such as the
Celebes Sea and convoyed north to Japan. Convoys from the
eastern Pacific are assumed to be escorted by U.S. ships to
some handover point in the mid-Pacific where Japanese escorts
would assume responsibility. Shilling's plan provides for
10 escorts per 60 ship convoy. Based on escort availability
and transit time, he estimates that four to five convoys could
arrive each month thereby meeting the projected "austere
import requirements."
Other military measures include the mining of the straits
of the Sea of Japan and an extensive ASV! campaign by patrol
aircraft based in Kyushu and Okinawa. Shilling also proposes
a series of mine barriers between the Ryukyu Islands augmented
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by sonobuoy fields to detect and destroy any submarines try-
ing to penetrate the barrier.
As was mentioned earlier, Shilling's plan assumed peace-
time ships arrivals at 2,150 per month in 1977 while the
actual count came to 3,350. Actual import tonnage however
was below his initial estimates indicating a leveling off
in the trend toward larger capacity ships such as supertank-
ers and bulk ore carriers. Using the same percentage reductions
for an "austere import" program, and assuming 3,^00 ship
arrivals per month, 436 arrivals would be required to maintain
economic survival. Due to a fixed number of escorts available,
this would necessitate increasing the average convoy size
to approximately 100 ships thereby increasing control and
coordination problems and reducing the level of protection
provided by the escorts.
Another weakness in Shilling's plan is in his reliance
on massive and widespread sonobuoy and mine fields. The sea
area involved in attempting to mine the gaps between the
Ryukyu Islands makes that proposition nearly impossible,
l^rhile Japan's mine inventory may be sufficient to close the
major Sea of Japan straits, it is highly unlikely, even with
a massive building program, for Japan to have sufficient
quantities to close the island chain. Mine delivery would
also be a problem considering Japan ''s total lack of bomber
aircraft. ASW patrol aircraft are capable of minelaying but
the magnitude of the task is beyond their capacity. This
136

would relegate minelaying to surface forces and submarines,
an exceedingly slow method for the area to be covered. The
extent of the sonobuoy fields proposed by Shilling is also
beyond the capability of the MSDF. The requirement to provide
on-station monitoring of the sonobuoys, periodic reseeding of
the fields, and prosecution of detected submarines is well
beyond the capability of the MSDP.
Similar to criticism of Sekino's plan. Shilling does not
consider the implications of a Soviet mining program nor does
he consider the vulnerability of the ASW aircraft bases to
Soviet attack.
E. TAOKA PLAN^^
A more futuristic plan is proposed by Shunji Taoka which
calls for a force of 1,500 ASW helicopters to be stationed
on the merchant ships themselves which he estimates could
shelter one 50-ship convoy with one million tons of imports
daily.
This idea of convoy self-protection is very similar to
20proposals in the U.S. such as ARAPAHO. In these plans,
hydrophone arrays for the passive acoustic detection of enemy
submarines could be towed by some of the units in the convoy.
Sophisticated processing equipment, power supplies, communi-
cations gear and maintenance equipment could be containerized
for rapid and convenient installation and placed on the mer-
chants. Likewise, maintenance equipment for the ASW helicopters.
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living quarters for their crev/s and data processing equipment
could also be containerized. A bolt-on steel flight deck to
accommodate the helicopters would complete the transformation.
Personnel, availability equipment maintenance, and high
initial and operating costs are the main drawbacks to the
convoy self-protection plans. The numbers of highly trained
personnel required to maintain and operate the helicopters
and support equipment would simply not be available in the
early stages of war. The existing reserves for the MSDF
number only 600 men. This severe shortage of personnel also
impacts heavily in the maintenance field. The hundreds of
helicopters and thousands of containers of support equipment
would need constant attention and routine operational checks
to insure their reliability in the event of war. This addi-
tional manpower can only be found through the expansion of
current MSBF force levels. The costs for such a project
would be staggering and since it would require major funding
in peacetime, would face severe political opposition. Not
only would procurement of the helicopters and support equip-
ment require a massive initial outlay, the ongoing costs for
routine maintenance and added personnel expenses are prohibitive
F . SUMT4ARY
The historical record as well as the results of several
studies seem to indicate that convoys are a more effective
method of merchant ship protection than the use of barrier
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or area search tactics. Of the many variations of convoys,
it would also appear that escorted convoys utilizing some
type of pulsed shipping is most promising.
Regarding the plans devised specifically for Japan, the
economic measures proposed by Shilling and to a lesser extent,
Sekino, seem to be fundamental to the success of any military
solution. Although the plans under consideration all possess
some measure of merit, they all contained serious shortfalls
in their military feasibility. A common fault among all the
plans is the failure to evaluate Soviet mine blockade of
Japanese ports and sea-lanes. While the planners may have
considered the 38 mine warfare ships of the MSDP, augmented
by the smaller countermeasures craft of the Maritime Safety
Agency, sufficient to keep the Japanese ports and harbors
clear, it does not seem prudent to assume away such a vital
consideration.
A second common weakness lies in the reliance each plan
places on the blockade of the Sea of Japan straits and the
ensuing attrition of Soviet submarines and surface craft in
returning to port for rearming and refueling. The increasing
use of Vietnamese harbors such as Danang, Cam Rahn Bay, and
Haiphong by Soviet warships would seem to foreshadow their
use as a logistics base in a wartime situation. In addition,
Soviet advances in underway replenishment, as employed by
the U.S., will, at least for their surface forces, eliminate
the necessity for frequent port stops.
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The final area of neglect comes in antiaircraft defenses.
The proximity of Japan and her sea-lanes to Soviet mainland
air bases, coupled with the proliferation of and technologi-
cal advances in cruise missile technology, make Japanese
convoys highly susceptible to interdiction from the air. Air
defense capability of the MSDF is virtually nonexistent and
shore-based air defenses have little at-sea capability.
The most feasible method of sea-lane protection for Japan
would seem to be some method of escorted pulsed shipping.
Minimum import levels could only be maintained, however , if
military weaknesses are corrected. Improvements which must
be undertaken as a minimum requirement would be: (1) increased
minelaying capability, particularly in the procurement of
minelaying aircraft; (.2) continuing quantitative and quali-
tative improvements in the mine countermeasures force to
offset a Soviet offensive mining campaign, and (.3) signifi-
cant improvements in air defenses both for convoy protection
and for the defense of shore bases for ASW patrol aircraft.
li+Q

VII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR
UNITED STATES' POLICY
Based on official statements from both military and
political leaders and on an analysis of the trends and pro-
jections for MSDF procurement, it is quite evident that Japan
is not actively engaged in developing a convoy escort capa-
bility. The current inventory of 59 escort-type ships
falls far short of Hideo Sekino's convoy requirements of
96 ships. Shilling's plan, which required only 50 ships,
was calculated on five convoys of 60 ships with 10 escorts.
We have seen that a revision of his estimates to reflect
actual circumstances would require five convoys of 100 ships
thereby increasing total escort requirements by about 32 ships
2
to a total of 82. In the face of these minimum force levels
for convoy protection. Prime Minister Suzuki, in recent state-
ments, announced that Japan will attain the NDP Outline
strength level by 1987. He has further stated that there
are no current plans to revise or update the Outline which
callsfor a total of 60 escort-type vessels for the MSDF.
An examination of warfare deficiencies that would have
to be strengthened should the Japanese desire to attain a
convoy escort capability reveals a level of inattention equal
to that found in the quantitative analysis. One of the most
serious deficiencies in Japanese convoy escort capability
is an almost total lack of aircraft and missile defenses.
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Only three ships are currently equipped with a medium-range
anti-aircraft missile that could provide any measure of pro-
tection for convoy units. While all newer construction escort
ships are being equipped with the short-range Sea Sparrow
missile and a close-in weapon system, these will provide a
self-defense capability only and will offer no protection
to the escorted units. In addition, the medium-range systems
that do exist are only marginally effective against low alti-
tude, high-speed anti-shipping missiles because they were
developed primarily to be used against larger, higher-flying
targets. The most effective method of air defense for a
convoy would be the development of carrier-based fighter
protection, an option that has not even been seriously con-
sidered by the Japanese.
One area of significant development is the installation
of Harpoon surface-to-surface m.issiles on several surface
combatants. While this will give the MSDF a significant
capability against enemy surface commerce raiders, without
the parallel development of anti-air defenses, it would appear
to be a fruitless effort. This development only seems logical
in the context that the missiles are meant to be used as an
anti-invasion force while remaining entirely under the cover
of ground~based air support. In this role, the existing
anti-aircraft capability could also be rationalized. As
another alternative, with anti-ship missiles and anti-aircraft
self-defense, the ships of the JMSDF would be suitably equipped
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to combat the missile-equipped forces of any of the regional
nations in the event of a highly localized conflict.
A second shortfall in Japan's convoy escort capability
is her lack of logistics support for combat units away from
their homeports. With only two oilers capable of providing
underway refueling and only a marginal capability for under-
way rearming, the MSDF could not sustain convoy escort operations
Similarly, there are currently no plans to increase the logis-
tics support mission in the near future.
Japan's submarine fleet consists of 14 units, eight of
which are a modern design. While it is widely acknowledged
that submarines are the most effective anti-submarine plat-
forms, long range development of the MSDF calls only for the
one-to-one replacement of existing units rather than any
quantitative improvements. If the submarine is to be the
primary anti-convoy weapon, it would only seem reasonable that
a nation engaged in convoy defense preparations would make
efforts to stem this particular threat.
In short, based on quantitative and qualitative analysis,
the MSDF does not have T:he capability to effectively provide
escort protection to merchant shipping destined for Japan in
the event of a Soviet interdiction campaign. Moreover, in
looking at long-range plans for building and for technical
development, there is no indication that the Japanese v;ill





Japan does not believe it has the capability of militarily
protecting its sea-lanes. Official statements are consistent
in their declarations of having no intention of sea-lane con-
trol in the area of the Indonesian straits and they have
consistently accepted ASW and convoy escort responsibility
within their immediate sea area only with the cooperation of
U.S. forces. As was noted earlier, Osamu Kaihara has been a
longtime spokesman for the futility of convoy defense in the
face of the Soviet threat. He believes that the vulnera-
bility of the Japanese main islands, their ports and harbors,
makes the question of sea-lane defense merely academic. He
believes that even if Japan could thwart the USSR in a struggle
for sea-lane control, the Soviet Union would then resort to
annihilation of the Japanese infrastructure. Official docu-
ments also stress the futility of a Japanese effort to protect
the sea-lanes as evidenced by the 1979 White Paper that ex-
pressed doubt that even the U.S. Seventh Fleet could prevent
5the Soviet Union from interdicting sea-lanes.
This lack of confidence in Japan's military capability
however, does not reflect their deep appreciation of the im-
portance of the sea-lanes and imports to their economic
survival. V/hile there is no evidence that Japan has embarked
on a program to militarily secure her sea-lanes, her efforts
on the diplomatic front are widespread. The government and
private industry are stockpiling strategic materials in order
to minimize the effects of drastic price increases or temporary
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interdiction. Increased emphasis on foreign investment and
foreign loan programs have, along with an increase in foreign
assistance programs, been geared toward promoting goodwill
and cooperation between Japan and supplier nations. Sources
of strategic materials are being diversified in a conscious
effort to create and use monopsony techniques.
The Japanese have evaluated the Soviet threat as being
primarily directed against the major islands. They have con-
cluded that if interdiction of her sea-lanes is attempted,
it will be a program directed either at the source of supply
or at the terminal points, the harbors and bays of Japan.
As such, the Japanese have concluded that economic and diplo-
matic efforts as outlined above, will be the most effective
method of dealing with an interdiction campaign directed at
the sources of supply. A campaign against the Japanese harbors
and bays would be best served by maintaining their excellent
mine countermeasures force in a high state of readiness and
in concentrating other MSDF efforts to coastal defense and
in controlling the strategic straits of the Sea of Japan.
Soviet writing, specifically that of Admiral Gorshkov in Sea
Power of the State , have consistently downplayed the role of
sea-lane interdiction as a primary mission for the Soviet
navy. Giving the Soviets credit for recognizing the vital
importance of Japanese sea-lanes to the security of Japan
and the U.S., one must assume that the Soviets have alternative
methods in mind for stopping Japan's commerce. Two alternatives
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are immediately obvious. The destruction of Japanese port
facilities and harbors would effectively shut off all imports
or the Soviets could, on the other hand, utilize a mine block-
ade of the harbors and shipping lanes. The Soviets have
used mines effectively since the Crimean War and considering
that their current inventory of naval mines is larger than
that of the rest of the world combined, it would seem logical
if that alternative were chosen.
The Japanese have been straightforward in stating the
purposes and goals for the r^ISDF and have developed the MSDP
toward those goals without deviation. The Defense White Paper
of 1979 states that there has been no change in the basic
premise of Japanese national defense policies from those adopted
by Cabinet approval in 1957. The White Paper asserts that
within this framework, the Defense Build-up Plans were
"...aimed at building a defensive capability able to effective-
ly meet the type of aggression on a scale no greater than
localized conflict with conventional weapons." It also stated
that the goal of the current guide for military procurement
and development, the National Defense Program Outline, which
is slated for attainment by 1987, is "To be capable of rebuff-
7
ing cases of limited and small-scale aggression..." Sea-lane
defense is only considered within the limited definition of
the local "sea area" and then only with the assistance and
cooperation of the U.S. Navy.
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From the American point of view, this philosophy of
defense is very difficult to understand. The American solu-
tion, upon recognizing a threat to their security, would be
to counter that threat with equal or greater force. This
difference in outlook has led to persistent U.S. requests
for increases in the Japanese defense budgets and subsequent
Japanese maneuvering to avoid the issue. The concept of a
Comprehensive National Security Plan (CNSP), which is being
promoted by the ruling Liberal-Democratic Party, is a good
example. Amid U.S. requests for increases in the Japanese
defense budget, the CNSP was developed to provide up to 5
percent of the GNP for security. (Defense spending is cur-
rently 0.9 percent of GNP.) Within the context of CNSP,
however, security is defined in very broad terms and includes
defense as one of its component parts. Programs which would
be included in CNSP funding are economic aid, economic devel-
opment programs, resource development, and cultural exchange
programs. Defense spending would remain at under 1 percent
of GNP. U.S. critics have labeled the plan as nothing more
than a ploy to avoid increasing military spending. The fact
that the CNSP actually represents what the Japanese consider
to be the optimum solution to their security problems goes
relatively unnoticed.
In his book Gunboat Diplomacy , James Cable explained that
Q
there are two basic levels of naval development. One must
first build a navy that can provide some measure of defense
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against aggression in local waters. By so doing, this navy
will also be able to deter attempts at coercive diplomacy
and political blackmail. This mission can be accomplished
by a limited number of appropriately armed small combatants.
To attain the next level in naval development, that of being
able to combat a major naval power, one must make a quantum
jump in numbers of ships, weapons, logistic and support facil-
ities available for use. Any position on the middle ground
is simply not cost effective because it provides more power
than necessary to deal with harassment and coercive diplomacy,
yet insufficient strength to counter a major assault.
The development of the Japanese navy in particular, and
the Self-Defense Forces in general, seems to indicate that
the Japanese goal is to remain as a small, defensive force.
They have specifically forsaken the development of an offen-
sive military capability in favor of building massive economic
and industrial power. Through international trade and economic
interdependence, the Japanese have attempted to create an
atmosphere of economic deterrence designed to ensure a U.S.
response to a threat to Japanese security. On the other hand,
their industrial infrastructure considerably sweetens the
pot if an aggressor could win a military or political victory
without the physical destruction of the cities and industry.
The term "Finnlandize" is much overused but should be consid-
ered as a realistic possibility in this case.
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The United States is well aware of the potential threat
to the Japanese sea-lanes but does not have sufficient forces
to provide them adequate protection against Soviet interdic-
tion, especially in the likelihood of wide-ranging conflict.
The Nixon Doctrine is still very much in effect as evidenced
by constant pressure on the Japanese to increase defense
spending. This approach, however, has not been productive
in the past and there is no reason to believe in its future
success. The Japanese view these actions as being heavy-
handed and blunt, causing a deterioration in relations. A
different tactic is being pursued at the working levels which
promises a more amicable, and from the U.S. point of view,
more advantageous solution. Within the context of the 1978
Guidelines of Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation, drafts of joint
operation plans are being written, procedures for cooperation
in intelligence and logistics support activities, and standard
defense measures are being devised. It is this forum that
should be used to expand Japan's defense responsibilities,
not by addressing levels of defense spending, but by joint
agreement as to the actions and responsibilities of each party
in various threat scenarios. Once agreement is reached based
on expected capabilities, the military procurement required
to attain that capability can be left to the Japanese.
In the longer term, the United States must begin to under-
stand the Japanese point of view toward security and defense.
The Japanese may be persuaded to take a larger role in their
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self-defense but they will not in the foreseeable future,
cross the line to become a military superpower. U.S. policies
should be aimed at dissolving any binding commitments to the
security of Japan. The Mutual Security Treaty (MST) is a
specific area where the United States should initiate steps
to realign its security commitments to Japan. The Treaty,
as a minimum, should be renegotiated to reduce U.S. obliga-
tions and should be abolished if possible.
From the U.S. standpoint, cancellation or revision of the
MST would allow more flexibility for military and security
planning by removing the absolute commitment to protect the
Japanese home islands. While some writers argue that Japan
is vital to U.S. security, if for nothing more than economic
ties, in the event of widespread war, Japanese trade and
economic well-being will be low on the list of U.S. priorities
Although the abolition of the Mutual Security Treaty would
be preferable from the U.S. point of view, a revision of the
treaty may serve as a mutually acceptable step in policy
evolution between the two nations. Because of the potential
political damage and economic repercussions of abolishing the
treaty, as was seen with Taiwan, an interim revision may be
the only politically feasible course of action. A revised
treaty should recognize the importance of Japanese security
and should only commit U.S. forces when the best interests of
the U.S. would be served.
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As competition for dx^:indling resources becomes more and
more competitive and Japanese interests in world trade and
markets increase, the probability of the Japanese becoming
involved in a conflict over resources increases. In its
policy toward Japan, it is imperative, therefore, that the
U.S. pursue a strategy which will provide maximum flexibility
based on its national interests without the encumbrances of
written or assumed obligations in non-vital matters.
The Japanese would undoubtedly resist revision or can-
cellation of the r^utual Security Treaty. From the security
standpoint, any modification will reduce Japan's security
guarantees and weaken their overall defense posture. It is
unlikely that revisions to the MST would lead to increased
political tension and to increased friction in economic rela-
tions and trade regulations. Recent public opinion surveys
indicate that a substantial portion of the Japanese population
do not believe the U.S. would come to Japan's aid in the event
of an attack on Japan under the present security arrangement.
Renegotiation of the Mutual Security Treaty would further
the perception of U.S. non-involvement and would highlight
the need for Japan to assume unilateral responsibility for her
own security. A resultant action may be the loss of U.S.
basing privileges in Japan but this option is unlikely because
it does not provide any clear benefit to Japan. In fact, by
denying the U.S. base rights, the Japanese would be denying
themselves a certain measure of security provided by the
deterrence value of the U.S. presence.
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Arguments have been made for renegotiating the Mutual
Security Treaty to provide for reciprocal obligations in case
of attack. This option, however, offers few benefits to either
side and is therefore highly unlikely. The U.S. would gain
a commitment for Japanese assistance if attacked but, in any
general war situation, it would be difficult to imagine a
scenario where the entirety of Japanese assets would not be
required for the defense of the home islands. On the other
hand, Japan would not gain any security assurances beyond
those prescribed in the current treaty and, in fact, would
increase the likelihood of conflict by linking itself with
U.S. actions. At the same time, for Japan to agree to a
treaty with reciprocal obligations, it would first have to
revise the Constitution to permit forward deployment of mili-
tary forces.
Cancellation or revision of the Mutual Security Treaty
would bring diverse reactions from other Asian nations. Most
nations would interpret the action as a lessening of U.S.
interest and resolve in Asia. Southeast Asian nations, in
general, would be moderately favorable, applauding an end to
U.S. interference and may be more receptive to an increased
Japanese role in the regional power balance. China's reaction
would be generally unfavorable but would be couched entirely
in terms of the impact on the military balance with the
Soviet Union. South Korea would be highly critical of the
action because of the linkages between Japan ""s security and
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their own. Realizing that a primary political factor for
justifying U.S. security commitments on the Korean peninsula
is the security of Japan, the Republic of Korea would be con-
cerned that a revision of U.S. commitments to Japan would
lead to similar actions in Korea. North Korea, on the other
hand, would welcome any reduction of U.S. military or politi-
cal presence in northeast Asia. The Soviet Union would also
approve of any lessening of U.S. involvement in the security
affairs of Japan. In fact, the Soviet Union had previously
used the disputed northern islands as an enticement to per-
suade Japan not to sign the 196O Mutual Security Treaty.
United States' policies toward Japan following World
War II were designed to encourage economic recovery without
the added burden of having to divert development capital into
defense projects. Now that Japan has emerged as an economic
superpower with the world's third largest GNP, the United
States should relinquish the responsibility for Japan's defense
United States' policies should provide maximum flexibility
to pursue its national goals and should stress that the U.S.
will exercise options only if clearly beneficial to the best
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